Understanding how discourses shape the ways in which we think about the structural influences on research (Schmeichel, Sharma, and Pittard); to the ways in which evidence is imagined and produced in support of such knowledge claims (Baker); how this shapes the possibilities for shifting knowledge production processes by centering students (Rubin, Ayala, and Zaal); or how teacher’s classroom knowledge comes to be valued (Theodorou, Philippou, and Kontovourki), all the authors in this issue further demonstrate that the answer to the quintessential curriculum question — “what knowledge is of most worth?” — is far from uncontested. Their work underscores the central importance of an expansive definition of curriculum not just for curriculum studies and curriculum theorizing, but for expanding and enhancing the potential of new forms of educational engagement across contexts.

To show is to know? The conceptualization of evidence and discourses of vision in social science and education research

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Abstract
The demand for evidence in particular forms shapes contemporary educational policy. Curriculum studies debates over the politics of knowledge “versus” wisdom, and research into classroom practice. This paper provides a genealogical trace that examines the arbitrary and historical linkage of discourses of vision (especially when vision becomes visuality) and the conceptualization of evidence (especially when evidence becomes empiricism-as-density). The analysis elaborates two counter-memories of post-ocular and post-empiricist debates over truth claims that educators have engaged amid the formation of Western social sciences. The counter-memories open consideration of the uneven legacies, politics and problems operating through forms of rationality now popular in ethico-redemptive sciences. The final section links nodal points in historical debates to the rethinking of evidence and vision in contemporary movements such as big data and mindfulness practices. The paper concludes with consideration of the changing, polarizing and relative aspect of networked power and different tactics of reason that social science, educational and curriculum inquiry face in the twenty-first century.

In the first decade and a half of the twenty-first century, educational policy, curriculum studies’ debates over the politics of knowledge “versus” wisdom and research into classroom practice have had to engage a fast moving, easily glossed and relatively unscathed phenomenon; the demand for evidence in particular forms (Lather, 2007; Tait, 2015; Taubman, 2009). This demand is key to a variety of new terms that allude to the specificity of forms and the stakes. From impact factors to learning analytics to critical realism, old flashpoints in worldviews are reactivated while new strategies of legitimation irrefrangible to past moments ensue. Cognates such as information, data, standards, accountability, visibility, transparency, and knowledge circulate in proximity in a range of sites, including national curriculum frameworks, local school policies and research metrics. At a minimum, such cognates imply that seeing is believing and to show is to know: what counts as evidence must be visible in some form (albeit not reducible to the ocular portal but part of sensory perception), it must be publicly verifiable (not just “in your head” and no one


metaphors for light and that seeing through the eyes is not the only or even necessarily the best basis for thought or knowledge. Put another way, reference to vision implies a breadth that may not be reducible to "the senses" of the flesh yet the vocabulary appears to implicitly privilege metaphors of seeing. This creates a methodological conundrum, for the vocabulary already assumed as "visually related" is deployed while the philosophical context for the vocabulary may often problematize such a move or naturalization. As such, Levin’s levels include: (1) philosophy is a historical construction that has often relied on a vision-generated vocabulary and way of thinking including words, methods, and methodological concepts such as speculation, observation, insight, reflection, evidence, intuition, mirroring, clarity, perspective, point of view, horizon of understanding, the light of reason, totality, analysis, objectivity, reflective detachment and representation, (2) philosophy has drawn on an ocular vocabulary for the construction of a system of thought and (3) at the same time, it has constructed a model of the gaze profoundly hostile to the testimony and claims of vision-through-the-eyes. Such simultaneous and different trajectories mean "the use and the construction of this vocabulary need to be examined, together with the discursive effects of such use and construction" (p. 2).

The take away point from several decades of such examination is at the very least that how vision has been used and constructed in Western philosophies exceeds reduction to the operation of the human eye: "visual perception" is never just a simple, immediate, straightforward, unproblematic presentation of the phenomenon of vision and is multivisual: "This work of construction is not the work of any one philosopher but is rather, the product of an intricate historical discourse involving many different philosophers and their texts," including discursive strategies and instruments (Levin, 1997, p. 7; emphasis added). Significantly, the multivisuality typically points to a larger horizon of debate tying discourses of vision to other positions that are not simply past tense. Their availability is actually part of a larger cultural debate over the hegemony and character of vision in the contemporary world, where in question are: the formation of individual identity, the composition of social relations, the cultural genealogy of stereotypes, the administrative power of the state, the visibility and accountability of governmental agents and agencies, the human relationship to nature and use of the environment, and the construction of discursive sites, of places and spaces, in the public sphere. (Levin, 1997, p. 7)

The historicizing literature generally acknowledges this, following the Philosophy 101 arc – from ancient Greece to the twenty-first century West – pointing out shifting inscriptions of particular conceptual clusters and connected vocabularies, especially Being, light, and knowing in different episteme (Jay, 1994; Levin, 1997). It does so with sensitivity to vast differences in roles that discourses of vision have played particularly in claims to truth. The difficulty this poses for selecting and reapproaching texts are many. While analogous and conceptual clusters can be claimed, it is also the case that vocabulary associated with the term vision is not universal. Moreover, when polyvalent, multivisual discourses of vision are tied to wider terms of debate such as questions of (non)Being, for example, they can have oppositional “horizons,” from reinscribing to contesting a subjectivity. In Genealogy and Ontology of the Image and its Digital Future, Lechte (2012) notes that while in today’s digital world the presumption is that “vision” is generally tied to “seeing,” meaning a public consensus around what is commonsensically labelled as an image on a screen privileging observation through the eyes, in Plato’s Greece anything that smacked of the status of an “image” was rankled a falsity. The “fact” that two people could claim to see an image at the same time did not make it Truth. Truth could not be anything but the original forms, which in/famously could not be “seen” in the darkness of Republic’s cave. Reality was not the object you held in your hand or the picture of something on a wall, nor was reality the body. These “material things” were illusionary not “empirical evidence” or “data” in a qualitative study of a classroom. Truth and reality are understood to be elsewhere, away from material embodiment, and to be especially in the most ideal Form of all, the Form of the Good.

Here, vision is not reduced to human sight and the naked eye in “the observer.” A human perceiver does not play a foundational role in which human consciousness does the noticing and selecting from a scene in front of the face. Moreover, physiological blindness is not the Other of vision. Such assumptions would naively gloss differences in cosmologies by casting more modernist inscriptions back over a “subjectivity without subject” that has become almost impossible to relate to. Crucially, for Lechte, then, within a Platonic cosmology the human subject is not the driver of perception, nor necessarily distinguishable as “the subject” at all. Rather, how things come to notice remains ambiguous, the source is not necessarily singular and the “location” not necessarily in the head. In a world where “humans,” gods, and animals mate, transmogrify, transact, and reincarnate, vision becomes mentioned as an onto-epistemological strategy concerned with “proving” the moral superiority of Being and pertains to the revelational apprehension of the forms and the idealism of Goodness (Baker, 2001). It does not pertain to a route for truth-produc- tion that travels unmediated through sensory portals or that ends up in the brain.

The more restricted definition of vision to seeing with the eyes (hereafter vision-as-usuality) is often denoted back to faint beginnings in Aristotle’s “scientism” and moves forward in different incarnations from there (see Baker, 2012a). While Jay notes (1994) to some extent the differences between the Hellenic and Hebraic trajectories, and muddles the distinction between medieval oculaphobic and modern oculocentric cultures, other literature moves beyond the tyranny of Greece and the Middle East (Byun, 1990; Clark, 2007; El-Bazy, 2003; Smith, 1998/2008). A more primary role for what are now called the senses in epistemology, and especially the eyes, has been attributed a significant lineage going back at least to North African philosophies, particularly cosmologies circulating within ancient Egypt that were subsequently modified by Aristotle. The preservation and reinterpretation as text is then attributed to Islamic scholars and Celtic monks, enabling a reinvention into medieval Latin Europe now known as Aristotelianism, which thereby flourishes among the Scholastics (Byun, 1990; Clark, 2007). This is seen as the messy beginnings of optics, where vision-as-usuality starts to emerge as a stronger player of the rationale for epistemology and the conduit of proof; and where this belief system takes hold beyond the theatricalization of Church doctrine and adornment of ornaments (Jay 1994, p. 39). Such a belief system that inaugurates the “to show is to know” mentality in Byzantine and medieval cultures becomes presumptively and augmented later in the study of “species” (Jay, 1994; Lechte, 2012). The modern advent of oculocentrism in what Jay separates out as theology and science enables elaboration of “exosomatic organs” called technology (p. 3) – the effort to extend, substitute or enhance the limited power of the eye.

As Clark (2007) has argued, however, oculocentrism has been on the offensive for over a century, and not just in French thought or religious studies: "Above all, perhaps, thanks
to developments in art history, visual anthropology, and visual hermeneutics we now take for granted the constructed nature of vision and the extent to which visual perception and visual meaning are fused" (p. 9). This fusing, especially of optical theory with cognitive philosophy, Clark attributes in part to the pivotal role of Islamic scholar, Alhazen (c. 965-1040). For Clark, Alhazen characterizes vision as transmission of image or picture through the optic nerve to the brain – a belief infused into medieval and early modern thought. A shift from attempts to make linear perspective equivalent to vision to the idea that vision itself was pictorial was facilitated by the idea of a point-by-point mapping onto the eye of rays of lights transmitted from objects along a "visual pyramid." Alhazen suggested that after leaving the object as a mosaic of visible colour and light the custodial power of the optic nerve preserved the picture with perfect integral order to reach the forefront of the brain intact. Key here is the cosmological assumption that drives the process of attribution: "That the entire process was dictated by causal demands that made each form in the sequence a cause of its successor and an effect of its antecedent also helped to ensure that the picture of reality occurring in the brain was veridical" (Clark, 2007, p. 16). Perceptual certitude becomes assured because categories or species are taken as natural signs of their objects, making the external object, the species and the mental representation of it ontologically continuous. The integrity and coherence of the image between object and brain was taken as a radical new line of thought in which it was postulated that if things external to us "are able to reproduce their essential qualities in our senses and minds, then the content of the mind is assuredly objective" (Clark, 2007, p. 16).

This is the belief system most associated today with oculocentricism in an objectivist sense: seeing through the eyes is believing, to show is to know, knowing must come through (the now) five senses, but especially important are the eyes and the link to belief in mind storage. Even if oculocentricism is doubtiously flattened out as a singular historical category with different manifestations and rendered backwards as that which links medieval and early modern episteme, however, the task is not the same for Alhazen, Galileo Galilei or the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Christian scholar, Sir Isaac Newton. Newtonian conceptions in particular shift the grounds upon which claims to objectivity are made. What elaborates the radical new line of thought that linked vision to linear perspective and linear perspective to the pictorial via the eye was the emergence of observation and experiment in medicine especially. Here, the term empirical first appears in English-language documents and it captures Alhazen’s sense of vision as though somehow objective and outside theory, principle, prejudice or affect.

The term appears earliest in English in 1500s as a noun, Empirik, and refers to medical practitioners who attend to the body through trial and error. It draws initially from Latin, empiricus, which also derives from Greek analogues for experience, skilled, trial and experiment. The term moves into adjectival form more noticeably in the 1600s. As an adjective, at least five inscriptions have been developed from 1600s to 1900s, including a physician who bases methods of practice on observation and experiment, not on scientific theory; a remedy that is successful in practice, with efficacy unknown; surgery without scientific knowledge and guilty of quackery; in matters of art or practice, being guided by mere experience; and in the disciplines, pertaining to or derived from experience, such as empirical psychology versus rational psychology (OED online).

In accounts of the history of occidental philosophy, John Locke has been positioned as the father of empiricism, as well as the father of psychology and arguably of childcentredness. Lockeian epistemology emerged in the period of uptake of the English term evidence, whose major inscriptions in the mid-1600s as to make manifest and clear (OED online), was in contrast to the idea of the Empirik. To this end, Lockeian epistemology stood in contradiction to Cartesian versions, especially in regard to the role of the Body (Locke, 1692/1975). It was also, though, indebted to what Descartes opened in terms of discourses of vision. As a kind of progenitor for both rationalism and sensationalist philosophy:

the Cartesian contribution to the dominant oculocentric bias of the modern era, especially in his native France, was assuredly profound. A major source of that influence, it seems probable to assume, was the very ambiguity of his argument. If, as is often claimed, Descartes could become the warrant for rationalist and sensationalist philosophies, claimed by materialists and idealists alike, he was no less able to give encouragement to both speculative and empiricist concepts of vision. Despite his avowed dualism, the specular element in his philosophy could foster an ultimately idenitarian monism. (Jay, 1994, p. 80)

This monism was dedicated to what Descartes actually called “clear and distinct ideas” modelled on the superiority of the “mind’s eye.” However, the version of “clarity” carried and required by the term evidence as it became linked to the term empirical in a positive rather than negative way demonstrates Locke’s difference.

For Locke, Mind and Body (capitalized in his texts) stand on their own, each with unique mechanical laws of operation. The Body does not err as for Descartes, and is not a site of sin or illusion (Locke, 1692/1989). The Body senses facts through a variety of sensory portals; sensation thus becomes distantiﬁed from reﬂection, while the density of the flesh operates as a new point of appeal in the verbal (Baker, 2001). To make manifest and clear meant to point to the flesh and rely upon what it “spoke,” not to denigrate its role. Density, as opposed to soul, aura, energy, sky, seasons or exteriorized causabilities of resemblance, changed where one looked for truth-production, with enormous ramifications in centuries to come. Theories of human being in the nineteenth century, for instance, directed the “visual search” for “empirical evidence” not to resemblances across layers of the cosmos but rather toward minute, ever-proliferating differences, forwarding a relation especially between faces, head shape and skin in racializing, sexualizing and abeizing projects. The emergent biologist and social scientist of the time aimed to examine the density of the flesh and presume it “spoke” the truth, that it held an interpretable, “moral” relation to a buried or hidden depth.

Like Alhazen, however, Locke did attribute a kind of animus to the object - objects have powers that leave imprints in the Mind, and power has two kinds, motivity and resistance. Lockeian epistemology bequeaths, then, a different subjectivity/objectivity problematic that assumes an operational separation between subject and environment, which Plato could not, and establishes the way in which discourses of vision can operate in truth-production in terms now recognized as empiricist. The spatiotemporal definition of a subject/object distinction delimits humanity in new ways, then, and finds a special role for something called the self, launching somewhat discrete pathways of investigation in post-Cartesian epistemologies, of which Lockeian empiricism was one popular version. The consistency of self-presence and World becomes shattered, however, over the following century. From Kantian ambiguity over whether mind maps the world or world maps the mind to a series of trials related to head injury, drug and alcohol consumption, magic
shows and illusions, the discourse of vision-as-visuality and its role in veridicality changed dramatically.

By the twentieth century, confidence in the integrity – and neutrality – of mental representation had waned, while the mechanism of sight's formation had been transformed. For instance, in the late 1800s debates over discourses of vision, maturity was considered a development away from thought in terms of pictorial imagery to thought in terms of word-based language, and in particular sentences. Some scholars have seen this as a broader Christian-based disciplining of the pictorial as the feminine, marking the turn away from Iconography as a turn away from domains of expertise historically associated with the feminine (Clark, 2007). Others have posited that the separation of words from things generated complexities that included and exceeded concerns predicated on dual-sexed models of World (Foucault, 1970). In particular, it bequeathed an orientation to knowing that in refusing revelation as a pathway on the one hand, accepted on the other hand the disturbance in the ontological continuity of the external object, the species, and the mental representation. A slough of post-Kantian psychologies of perception, attention, isolation, and selectivity in what was "seen" eventuated, and according to Cray (1999), attention becomes a specifically modern problem because of the obliteration of the possibility of obviousness or self-presence given in seeing.

If we now "see" because of traveling photons between object and eye and if "brains" interpreted the traveling photons that hit the retina differently, then the eyewitness account loses its objectivity – the mental representation can be different in different people in regard to the objects perceived and the role of vision-as-visuality in truth and knowledge-production must subsequently be rethought. From Rational to Irrational: Explanatory Concepts and the Discovery of the Unconscious

The above genealogical trace illustrates how discourses of vision were tied to assertions of truth, Being, revelation and idealism; how the shift into Aristotelian scientism, medieval ocularphobia and modern occulcentrism enabled truth claims to become both questioned and procedural; and how in the process "evidence," as to make manifest and clear, became a point of appeal that turned on the reversal of empiricism's status. A reversal from dodgy stories about what worked to cure someone with no theoretical or principled plane to empiricism as interpretation of "matter-as-density" and as the main portal to reflection was effected. Such larger arcs of discourse played out across centuries of epistemic turbulence within different frames of reference. The shifts were thus not totalizable and entailed vociferous debate over the context, aims, and purposes of inquiry: from the nature of body-mind-soul, to debates over earth's origins, religions, the nature of governance and societies, to the delineation of species, territories, populations and more. Some of this is captured in the relatively more abstracted approaches considered below, which point to the ever-presence of cultural differences and disagreement at the heart of fledging empires and the rise of dominant discourses.

Curriculum inquiry has typically been well-attuned to the importance of such differences. Even so, what has often been neglected in curriculum inquiry, especially in the second half of the twentieth century and perhaps because of the risk of association with educational psychology, are those aspects of the debates that conjoin discourses of vision, empiricism and mindlessness, where mind is considered to be the place that "the curricu-

lum" a child might participate in or encounter is ultimately stored. Much work has been done on biases pertaining to "the body" (McCarthy & Birchlow, 1993; Pagano, 1992), as well as on deconstructing intelligence quotient (IQ), mental measurement and tracking (Netz & Watras, 1981; Watkins, 1990), on inscribing "disability" as positive ontology (Brattinger, 1997; Erenelles, 2000), and more recently on uplifting the sensorium and affect as broadly tied to different sources of knowledge beyond vision (Appelbaum, 2010; Gershon, 2011; Springgay, 2008). The onto-epistemological assumption that mind exists has, however, rarely been challenged (Baker, 2012b; Krippner, 1994). This onto-epi-

stemological assumption, and the allied discursive linking of vision-as-visuality and empiri-

Gism-as-density-as-materiality has, though, been questioned in quite cautious and rigorous ways far earlier than the advent of feminist postcolonial studies, postsecular and posthumanist sociologies, and postnatural philosophies.

In the northern trans-Atlantic Republic of Scholars, studies of extraordinary behaviour became a site of fascination in the late 1700s and new theories of mind-body-soul relation emerged. In some quarters, a radical materialist atheism that downplayed "soul" was pit-

ted against charges of re-securing the "T-as-soul in more politically conservative work (Richardson, 1999). One long term outcome of such disputes was a stricter scientization of mind especially. Across the 1800s, mind, more so than soul, was to become the new "invis-

ible thing" agreed upon as worthy of study and as that which separated humans from ani-

mals and humans from each other. By the early 1900s, whether through evolutionary biology or Christian metaphysics mind was no longer subjected to consideration as to whether such a thing existed but investigated in terms of its modalities of operation. One new modality was appeal to an unconscious zone, domain, or operation, which began far earlier than Freud. Unconscious here is not automatic reference to psychoana-

lytics as a discipline nor to psychoanalytic literature in curriculum studies. Both literatures eventuate far later than the debates that made such approaches possible. As such, Freud's famous rejection of hypnosis as a therapy, taken as the starting point of psychoanalysis, is of little import here, representing an endpoint of longer and broader investigations in which educationists, anatomists, biologists, medical practitioners, ministers, mediums, magicians and novelists participated across the 1800s (Ellenberger, 1970; Richardson, 1999).

The term unconscious comes into English-language documents in the late 1700s and early 1800s in what is now referred to as Romantic literature, not as the opposite of the conscious per se but as reference to the habitual and the automatic. Henri Ellenberger (1970) goes so far as to name this a discovery. Integral to that naming were a series of tri-

als referred to initially as animal magnetism, and which long before psychoanalysis had led to a questioning of the discreteness of self, of the speaker, and of speaking in one's own name.

Animal Magnetism, Mesmerism, and Hypnosis

New possibilities for inspecting an interior posited as invisible to the naked eye arose in research and experimentation under a variety of labels beyond animal magnetism, includ-

ing mesmerism, hypnosis, somnambulism, and magnetic slumber. In the late 1700s the therapeutic practices developed by Franz Anton Mesmer and popularized via his move to
the Parisian salons led to an important federal investigation headed by Benjamin Franklin, which debunked the therapy as charlatan just as Empirics once had been. Americans argued that a universal fluid, which is to be understood roughly as energetic rather than as wet, linked all animate and inanimate objects, planets, and beings. This entailed a monistic conception of problem and cure. A blockage of the fluid's flow caused all illness and unrest and its release through a healing crisis would restore harmony and balance. After the dismissal in the French report of the late 1700s further trials reappeared in the 1820s and 30s UK and continental Europe, becoming popular again in the USA, as Charles Poyen St. Saivre noted in his lecture tour, in the 1830s through the mid-century decades (Poyen St. Saivre, 1837, p. 63).

Debates over the "invisible influence" of "one person upon the mind of another" flowed into education and bamboozled observers there as elsewhere. For instance, Superintendent of New York public schools, William Stone, was invited to witness an episode of animal magnetism. He wrote in a letter to his doctor friend that he was confused about what to make of it:

I am not a positive believer in the system, because I know not what to believe; and yet, I am free to confess, that I have recently beheld phenomena, under circumstances where collision, deception, fraud, and imposture, were alike out of the question, if not impossible, which have brought me from the position of a positive skeptic to a dead pause. From the evidence of my own senses, I have been compelled, if not to relinquish, at least very substantially, to modify, my disbelief; and I can no longer deny, although I cannot explain, the extraordinary phenomena produced by the exertion of the mental energy of one person upon the mind of another, while in a state of what is termed magnetic slumber. (Stone, 1837, p. 5)

Stone was criticized for his letter and counter-responded, gathering accounts of animal magnetism from witnesses along the east coast, including accounts of children magnetizing each other in schools. He published some of these in the newspaper he edited and continued to remain open to thinking through what he called "the evidence of my own senses."

In the perceived absence of frameworks through which to account for the capacities and behaviours Stone described, further templates arose dedicated to stylizing what are now called altered states. Three states were often identified. They were considered potentially mixed in form and could be displayed differently, originally or separately, they may or may not be produced in succession within a subject, and the order could differ. However, for scholars such as Alfred Binet, who developed the groundwork for the notion of IQ and whose first area of training and experience (1999) calls tropicopolitans at the centre of the "normally developing child" of whiteness. The significance of such an "invisible" construct to population-altering strategies and this lodging should not be underestimated. In G. Stanley Hall's (1901) child-study, for example, recapitulation theory is double-edged. Recapitulation is taken as biological law (Hall, 1904). That means, however, that every child of whiteness has within them the stages of evolution that "Natives" passed through. If this cultural phase is considered biologically inside, then for white privilege to continue to operate as synonymous with the terms civilization and civilized, Nativity must also be left behind (Baker, 2001). Here, progress and development take on clearly racialized, sexualized and ablebodied stigmat meanings, for under Hall's formulation all females stop developing in adolescence, becoming at best "robust mothers," while entire groups of indigenous peoples and "Natives" are cast as adolescent races (Baker, 2001).
what is considered inherited and inside is restricted. The unconscious was but one explanatory concept, one form of rationalization, deployed to re-secure the prejudicial and a priori ontological system of "invented" it in Europe. Its "appearance" in educational research at the turn of the twentieth century impacted diverse domains for decades to come, yet often with little overt consideration in teacher education. In the first half of the twentieth century, the explanatory concept of the unconscious was relied upon as a real thing, as a truly existing thing, as an incontestable thing.

It is important to underscore, then, the arbitrariness of the unconscious as an explanatory concept that accrued an incredible reach, not because someone held it in their hands, photographed it, or could verify its "matter" across laboratories, but because its existence was inferred from behaviour that was initially thought to be extraordinary and/or supernatural. Here, what is counted as evidence, to make manifest and clear, is never fully resolved and thus points to the operation of other interpretive codes, to broader horizons in conceptualizations of World's and reality. For example, while the critique of the Oedipal in scholars such as Deleuze and Guattari (1987) appears to come from "within" a familiarity (and dislike) of psychoanalytic literature and while postcolonial analyses of the role of "the unconscious" have unpacked how integral "it" was to the rhetorics of empire, civilization, and privilege (Anderson, Jenson, & Keller, 2011), the provincialism and arbitriness of appealing to an unconscious is brought further into relief by a third set of observations whose site of production is not the metropole. Such observations are exterior to "its" horizon of enactment, participating in a conceptualization of "reality" that does not take up objects, which include "mental constructs," as anything other than conventionally real or true. In the case of (multiple) Buddhist epistemologies, for example, ultimate truth is beyond every day, conventional truth, and like for Plato, the object in front of you, or inside you in this case, is not what it seems. Ultimate truth is not an ideal Form, however, nor a discursive space to be filled by putting "things" in a particular order. In Mahayana Buddhism especially, it is Sūnyatā, emptiness, that is named as "something" that is "impossible" to name (Nagarjuna, 1995). Appeals to the "facticity" of an unconscious, then, serve as a window onto a particular worldview that is not shared, not universal and that "elsewhere" is not considered sufficient as an informative explanatory device:

In Western psychology, there may be a tendency to overemphasize the role of the unconscious in looking for the source of one's problems. I think that this stems from some basic assumptions that Western psychology starts with: for instance, it does not accept the idea of imprints being carried over from a past life. And at the same time there is an assumption that everything must be accounted for within this lifetime. So in particular order. In Mahayana Buddhism especially, it is Sūnyatā, emptiness, that is named as "something" that is "impossible" to name (Nagarjuna, 1995). Appeals to the "facticity" of an unconscious, then, serve as a window onto a particular worldview that is not shared, not universal and that "elsewhere" is not considered sufficient as an informative explanatory device:

The significance of this insight is to note how even in the absence of materialization in the form of fleshly density some explanatory concepts accrue a special reach based on the range of phenomena they can be marshalled to explain, while blocking other possibilities for the conceptualization of reality. The requirement of vision-as-seeing-with-the-eyes (visibility) is suspended, the role of all the other senses are suspended (you cannot smell the unconscious), reports are indirectly delivered through witnesses - "I saw this person acting funny after they took that drug or had that head injury" - and still the concept is believed in and treated as a factual presence inside the body, albeit in societies obsessed with anatomical dissection, scanning, measuring, and squeezing, and which still cannot "find" it.

**Technicalizing Instruments: Transcripts, Life/Death, and Spirit-Return**

It needs to be clear here that I am not advocating either form of analysis - the karmic or the psychiatric - as "the source of one's problems." Rather, the point is about veridicality as tied to extant worldview and "awareness" of when certain conditions of proof are applied and retracted to fit a status quo. In regard to animal magnetism, the blurring of multiple binaries and forms of producing and distancing others was at stake. The new practices and their shock value did not ultimately change the mainstream ontological hierarchies already in place in territories such as Poyen's United States, Sweden's England or Binet's France. Despite the potential to "flatten" such hierarchies that commentators such as Poyen could foresee and despite the excitement and titillation that the prospect of an unconscious held, what overrode what was "seen" and "unseen" were raced, sexual, and able-ized renditions of increasingly "nationalized" populations and the govern-mentality of mind theory articulated through the "density" and "materiality" attributed to phenotypic markers.

By the twentieth century, challenges came from different directions, and technology was gaining traction as a distinct thing, over and above just any augmentation or tool (Nordmann & Schwarz, 2009). Instrumentation was proliferating in a variety of emergent disciplines, including the social sciences and education. The ways in which technicalizing instruments, such as transcripts, were deployed to mediate a visible/invisible horizon, openly transformed debates regarding veridicality. Such deployments constitute an instance of a new kind of tactic that emerged in relation to empiricism's reign and abjections.

The work of William James is informative here.11 James took it upon himself to decide whether the phenomena he was observing could be attributed to this new thing called the unconscious or whether one would have to concede causations called superphysical and supernatural. The phenomenon James was observing had already been classified by contemporaries as psychological research and sometimes as occult. This did not necessarily make them low status, but did make them controversial. James was involved in psychological research for twenty-five years, was part of trans-Atlantic academic elite that comprised Cambridge and Harvard universities around such investigations as mediumship, clairvoyance, telekinesis, and so forth, and considered such phenomena to fall within the domain of education.12

When Richard Hodgson, one of James' best friend, and secretary of the American Society for Psychological Research (ASPR), which James helped to found, passed over while playing handball in New York, reports of his colleague being channelled were circulated rapidly thereafter. Both James and Hodgson had spent years studying a medium known as Mrs Leonora Piper. Piper had come to the ASPR's attention through the James family social circle and was eventually paid a retainer for her services. In the first decade of the new century, James enters in upon the question of spirit-return more fully, trying to decide if this is really his friend, Hodgson, being channelled through Piper, or whether there are more...
"naturalist explanations." He explains the set up early in his 1909 "Report on Mrs. Piper's Hodgson-contacts":

Richard Hodgson died suddenly upon December 26th, 1905. On December 26th a message purporting to come from him was delivered in a trance of Mrs. Piper's, and she has hardly held a sitting since then without some manifestation of what proved to be Hodgson's spirit taking place. Hodgson had often during his lifetime humorously said that if he ever passed over and Mrs. Piper was still officiating here below, he would 'control' her better than she had ever yet been controlled in her trances, because he was so thoroughly familiar with the difficulties and conditions on this side. Indeed he was: so that this would seem prima facie a particularly happy conjuncture of 'spirit' with medium by which to test the question of spirit-return. (James, 1909a/1986, p. 253)

Which conditions of proof to affirm in the test of such a thesis was part of a longer dispute. In publications and internal communications of participants in the ASPR the debate hinged on how what was visible to some was not visible to others and whether a lack of consensus around visibility meant unscientific (James, 1897/1986, 1909b/1986).

James notes that Hodgson jokingly agreed that should he pass over first he ought to try to return through Piper to clarify once and for all the spiritist thesis (James, 1909a/1986). Eight days after Hodgson's heart attack, Leonora Piper appears to observers to be channeling Hodgson. James explains the transcripts that he reviews in his Final Report are from the American sittings collated from 28 December 1905 to 1 January 1908. William, and sometimes his wife, Alice, attended the Piper-Hodgson sittings. "Hodgson" was described as eventually speaking in his own name without the conduit of Rector (the spirit thought to control things on the other side), with his name suspended in quotes in the original transcripts to indicate uncertainty over the status. James wrote up his review of the transcripts at the same time as his thoughts on pragmatism, radical empiricism, and pluralism. They were published a year before James passed over, at which point another series of claims regarding James being channelled were set off until 1930 (Blum, 2006).

Crucial in James' approach to the transcripts produced is that they are not taken a priori as data, nor as evidential. In the Jamesian approach, transcripts must be analysed for evidences and events that could be seen as evidential, as good test cases, for deciding upon the spirit-return thesis. The second-order normativity embodied in the approach — that there are conditions for what can count as evidence at all — places most of the transcribed sessions outside of detailed focus. Others remain, however, instructive in terms of conditions of proof:

**RH:** I think, William — are you standing?

**WJ:** Yes

**RH:** Well sit. Let's have a nice talk... Well, then about Hyslop's society. I think he will succeed in that. I feel very much encouraged in regard to that.

**WJ:** I certainly hope he will succeed.

**RH:** I want to ask you if you have met all Miss Gaule?

**WJ:** Maggie Gaule? I have not met her. [A medium known to R. H. during his life, probably also known by name to Mrs. P. — W. J.] I have tried to reach her. I have reached another light and I did succeed in getting a communication through.

**WJ:** What was your communication?
intersubjectivity, and suggestibility that mark social sciences, their inscription as Western, and the (un)availability of authenticity and purity in research. Such an apparent abyss as the after-life; unique models of causality, and the play of invisible objects would potentially threaten the attempted neat packaging of emergent disciplines and disrupt the presumption of a finite, this-worldly horizon, as well as the enforceability of stable boundaries around such entities as geopolitical territories, religions, and selves.

This was the uneasy dilemma within which James found himself located as adjudicator. It was uneasy because he sometimes criticized borders between disciplines and concepts, borders that he saw as false abstractions of more fluid phenomena, and he did not always offer in his analyses at large the easy way out. He is (in)famous for complicating binaries, taking distance from dualisms, wanting things both ways, or refusing to resolve dilemma by coming down firmly on one side or another. However, if in 1900 the ghost is verified as a scientific object (not as an object of psychical research, which James saw it as and which was different from science), if the ghost was not subjected to consideration of whether it exists but continuously analysed for its attributes (like mind), then the reinforcement of a West/Orient division upon which James comments directly elsewhere (for example, in Talks to Teachers published in 1899) is also at stake. The borders around the stereotype of the Orient as mystical, as past-life oriented, as transcendentalist would become blurred, and the very privilege of Protestant-based Institutions such as Harvard, amid the melting pot's other continuously present possibilities might be troubled as the twentieth century continued to unfold.

The veracity of James' conclusion is less the issue here than the shaping effects of invoking one "invisible" explanatory concept – the unconscious mind – to forestall another "invisible" object – the ghost- from being legitimated as scientifically real. In animal magnetism and the "discovery of the unconscious" the application and retraction of the criterion of "invisibility" is obvious, potent and uneven relative to considerations of empiricism-as-density-as-materiality. In the question of spirit-return, however, duelling "invisibilities" – the unconscious or a ghost – point to a politics of truth and knowledge production that cannot in and of itself reduce evidence and the empirical to the claims of an ocular portal, to density, or to a consensus that was considered self-evident and universal.

Implications: Networked Power and New Tactics in Reason?
The above examples of explanatory concepts and technicizing instruments underscore the heritage of disensus and unevenness even where "empirical evidence" within a modern episteme favouring ocularcentrism is heavily involved in truth claims and knowledge production. In contemporary movements, the heritage of conflict continues. While touchstones of an abjected past remain awkwardly present, the terms for debate over evidence and vision are today rapidly mutating.

As alluded to in the introduction, big data and mindfulness research appear to represent oppositional possibilities for procedural reason in education. They invite a series of new questions around the role and nature of evidence and vision and this is particularly so in current efforts to "softern" big data as it is taken up in education and to "harden" mindfulness research in the same. The contemporaneous efforts at softening and hardening point themselves, however, to other possibilities within which curriculum inquiry and educational institutions writ large might participate quite differently.

Big data, a neologism popularized in the early 2000s, is typically characterized as data in the form of the three Vs - volume, velocity and variability – with definitions circulating initially more in commercial realms and IT vocabularies, such as: "Big data is high-volume, high-velocity and/or high-variety information assets that demand cost-effective, innovative forms of information processing that enable enhanced insight, decision making, and process automation." Big data is not strictly reference to the purely numerical although that is its current dominant modality and metric. Evidence in this movement emerges out of the plethora of data possibilities or "captures" that could be made. That is, ocularcentric discourses of vision are reanimated with a twist that is not solely reliant on a human perceiver: in the first order, designing machines and infrastructures that can "see" large data sets intersecting from different sources and systems and making meaningful selections in order to construct narratives dedicated to efficiency, diagnosis, prediction and control is the required form of visibility. In the second order, the new "metrics" or narratives regarding what constitutes the Good (the ideal student, the good teacher, the high performing school, the global university, etc.) become the "lenses" through which agents involved in institutions and practices must now come to see-know themselves.

Knowing thyself is marked quite differently in the diffusion of mindfulness research, however. Mindfulness, coined in 1979 and popularized by Jonathen Kabat-Zinn circulated initially more in therapeutic and clinical settings and has become somewhat generically defined as "a...non-elaborative, nonjudgmental, present-centered awareness" (Bishop et al., 2004, p. 232). Like big data's relationship to numbers, i.e., dominant but not the only form, mindfulness' relationship to Buddhist epistemologies is not the only form, but the dominant narrative concerning its emergence in the West (Harrington & Dunne, 2015). Here, discourses of vision meet their limits as visual or ocular. Historic first-person phenomenological accounts, for example of meditative experiences, are tempered if not replaced by third-person perspectives on changes in biophysiological markers that are measurable. The "lenses" through which one would come to see-know themselves becomes largely neuro.

Through Chertoik and Stengers (1989/1992) approach to understanding the disconnect between theorectico-experimental and ethico-redemptive disciplines, however, such movements could also be "seen" as exposing the limits of particular philosophies of (social) science. The question of evidence in both instances opens onto the question of reason and of rationality as that which putatively secure the difference between human and animal, science and non-science. In that vein, the theorectico-experimental sciences have been dedicated to a purification process – the search for causal variable/s to explain an effect that is replicable across contexts. Appeals to big data would represent this effort, the effort to emulate the corporate sphere and the natural sciences, in which reason is thought to be demonstrated by quantifying, where pattern becomes causal, and where graphic or visual display is the key format of representation (Myer-Schoenberger & Cukier, 2014; Siemens & Long, 2011). Prediction, efficiency, and control here are highly valued:

perhaps surprisingly, the prevailing discourse around Big Data and education is increasingly one of efficiency and cost-effectiveness, both in terms of the use of the data to improve
education "delivery" and as a means of carrying out research in our field. While there is some merit in these claims, it is important that discussions of using data to enhance efficiency, increase transparency, support competitiveness, and as a tool to evaluate performance, (of schools and teachers) are tempered with considered academic debate. In times of austerity, commercial discourses become more significant in our debates about education. Thus, in some quarters Big Data is increasingly promoted as a form of "technical fix" for education research and practice,... rather than a focus on using these same tools to empower, support, and facilitate practice and critical research. (Lyon, 2013, p. 237)

Here, big data needs to be decentred, softened, and more overtly "culturalized," made more sensitive to the human beings whom it is supposedly about and for. For Chentok and Steengers, this softening effort would mark the difference that ethico-redemptive disciplines offer – the different tactics of reason, evidence, and causality that intersubjectivity and suggestibility incite. This difference, they argue, is captured most ardentely in the difficult case that animal magnetism and hypnosis have posed to "reason" in the West and especially its key feature - suggestibility. Because "the infant's relations with its caretakers are already characterized by what we should recognize as a form of suggestion" (1999/1992, p. xvii), the social sciences which focused on human relations could not so readily make a phenomenon admit its truth via a purification process: "suggestion puts 'truth' in question, that is, it problematizes the possibility of constructing a theory on the basis of experiment or experience. Suggestion is impure; it is the uncontrollable par excellence" (1999/1992, p. xvi).

Mindfulness research, especially mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR) then, would seemingly represent a more ethico-redemptive orientation, in which a continuous movement between heart and reason with savillic intent is accepted as the definition of rationality and where causality is understood as nudged by suggestibility, interconnectedness, and networks. Rather than the performance anxiety on the data domination, the promise of integration of an unconscious and conscious and attendant stress-reduction; rather than prediction per se, the alleviation of suffering; rather than the question of the ghost and spirit-return, the possibility of past lives and karma.

Despite curriculum studies' call for more attention to introspective and phenomenological accounts in the 1970s, "the contemplative turn" of the 2000s most associated with Kabat-Zinn's (2011) conception of mindfulness drawn from Buddhist sutras (or sutta), has taken off under a different burden of proof – as noted above, the measurement of the effects of mindfulness in replicable terms (Davidson, 2012). When mindfulness was coined in the 1970s (from Pali) it referred to first-person, introspective accounts, not for public "visibility" through one sense organ. Today, mindfulness research becomes accepted into education to the extent it can be "hardened," that is to the extent its outcomes take on the mantle of scienticity: "as mindfulness was shown to be an effective intervention as it was codified as a measurable construct, psychologists, neuroscientists, and educational researchers were quick to join in" (Ergas, 2014, p. 9). For some commentators this represents both an acceptance of preceding tendencies toward Americanisation and resistance to them that deeper, longer and more developmental approaches to a variety of contemplative traditions invite.

By the time of Kabat-Zinn introduced MBSR into the clinic, people already "knew" that, as medicalized, meditation might be good for stress-reduction and a general good tonic for health. People already "knew" that practices like Zazen, understood as a kind of "Eastern psychotherapy," were a path to being happy and free – a means of personal self-gratification and a way of enhancing one's wellbeing, its quest for a mainstream presence in the clinic and beyond, MBSR partially aligned itself with the Americanized understandings of Tradition, but MBSR also sought to move beyond them or to resist them, by embracing, at times implicitly or covertly, the spiritual and ethical concerns of the various reformist contemplative traditions that inspired it. It is not altogether surprising that MBSR did not completely succeed in this complex and perhaps paradoxical effort (Harrington & Dunne, 2015, p. 629).

Such binaries as science/non-science, theorectico-experimental/ethico-redemptive, heart/reason, visible/invisible, evidence/noise and conscious/unconscious, while helpful for understanding the differential formation and status of academic disciplines do not necessarily, though, communicate the complexity of contemporary movements in which education/healing/science/religion are becoming fused. Significantly, in "both" cases – the "softening" of big data and the "hardening" of mindfulness – there is a hierarchy within the fusion and a complication beyond it that may rewrite both evidence and vision. Ergas (2014) argues, for instance, that in the food chain of education's epistemologies "hard" science sits at the top but concurrently a more complex play of disenchantment and reenchantment of "both" religion and science is emerging in "a postsecular age." This has resulted in a strange alliance. The blurriness is exactly what allows leeway for mindfulness practices to make their way into mainstream education despite the rather esoteric origins (Ergas, 2014, p. 6). It also arguably allows for big data to appear relevant to raising children via "learning analytics."

The inside-out and outside-in potential of "both" movements has not been fully explored, however, and may make questions of evidence, discourses of vision, and belief in a uniquely human mind implode. Here, diagnoses of new forms of networked power (simultaneous dense nodal concentrations and fast and wide dispersal via connectivity)" are already on offer, in which old hierarchies of Enlightenment-industrialization via the nation-state are flattened by the transversal possibility of something coming from any-where to impact everywhere (Cooper Ramo, 2016). From artificial intelligence to network economics to climate change, the major twenty century metadisc of interconnectedness is now shifted by inclusion/exclusion (whose in? whose out?) of various networks embedded within and against other networks, of which educational institutions would be but one, has taken shape, transforming expectations and inciting appeal to evolutionary narratives of "adaptation" and "survival" to cope with new "realities" of faster, deeper, wider connectivity (Cooper Ramo, 2016).

Mindfulness could be invoked to understand both big data's range and mindfulness' integration mantra, means, however, that polarizing tendencies may continue. In that scenario, big data is used to evacuate a "middle class" of its former substance by potentially undermining consistently falling performativities in public institutions (Coo-per Ramo, 2016). Meanwhile, mindfulness is used to separate out those who are able to self-responsibilize and "adapt" and those who are not. This, in turn, would require new conversations about what the point of "interconnectedness," "innovation" and "networked power" actually is.

Amid such conversations, "evidence" and "vision" risk reinforcing and losing the broader horizons on which they have historically been formulated. This involves continuous reflation of science-as-top, while at the same time it requires the redefinition – if not evacuation – of the "illusion" of mind, of vision-as-visuality, of empiricism-as-density-as-materialism, and
of “selfhood” within Western notions of science. Here, the implications for what social sci-
ence and education would favour in terms of truth claims risk polarisation again amid the
fusion, bivalence a seemingly quantitatively driven corporeal and a seeming altruism: more
league tables for schools and allied institutions, greater pools of numerical data, and quanti-
fied evaluations of performativity in an achievements-based society, or, the possibility of
realizing “that there is no self behind the stress” once the “pandora’s box” of mindfulness
practice is “operationalised” to act back on and evacuate the very idea of “achievement,”
“procedure” and “reason”.

The suggestion of “contemplative inquiry” as part of science means not merely exploring
what could be conceived as a “spiritual practice” through conventional second and third
person inquiry. […] It rather pushes the boundaries of scientific methodology for its cur-
rent methodology delimits our understanding of phenomena… This is a science that
does not settle for Kantian reason that is confined to perceive phenomena within time
and space, it rather considers a perceptual apparatus that takes us perhaps as farther
est from a cold-objectivist reason as one can get, and conceives of it as a legitimate and
complementary source for knowing; a science that in fact leads to an epistemology of
love. (Egan, 2014, p. 14)

The implications for curriculum inquiry are profound, for the neatly sealed entities of
nations, territories, religions, theoretical frameworks, and selves become open to dispute
in ways that include yet exceed the complication of animal magnanimity or spirit-return,
exceeding, too, the linguistic, pictorial, visual and contemplative turns, disrupting easy
processes of attribution in explanation and analysis, and requiring a deeper interrogation.
This interrogation entails in part not just the “clash of civilizations” thesis but of wider
“Worlds” that are not reducible to the selective and repetitive focus on human-to-human
interaction (Gazambide-Fernández, 2015), sovereign power, dense bodies, eyewitnesses
and sentence-based expression.

It may be such, then, that the waves of new research that emanate in the twenty-
first century will be part of a proliferation of possibilities that social science and educa-
tion research has historically attempted to generate legitimation for and simulta-
neously “unconsciously” constrained, leaving to curriculum inquiry an important
responsibility and role different from mainstream social science. Mainstream social sci-
ence and education disciplines may become more and more journalistic, simply
reporting the “latest scientific discoveries” in “accessible language” by softening here
and hardening there, translating laboratory findings into classrooms and elsewhere,
ensuring diagnosis-prediction-control within an efficiency discourse of eradication-
maximization-profit, and forwarding relatively narrow conceptions of evidence and dis-
courses of vision to sustain networked power. By contrast, curriculum inquiry has both
the opportunity and responsibility to think otherwise. Already well-positioned as a
“culturally-attuned,” interdisciplinary field where social critique, ethics and bigger and
deepper pictures can still be raised, the field carries a unique responsibility at a pivotal
moment, born in part of its insider-outsider status. This responsibility is about keeping
open multifarious possibilities for Being that already exceed “to show is to know” amid
simultaneous pressures and debates over the necessity of standards, evidence, data,
mindfulness and responsible research that resists nihilism, relativism and the superfici-
ality of curriculum journalism.

Notes
1. I am not claiming to be outside the discourses under consideration here, including ecolarcen-
tram, modern geographical discourse, notions of linear time, etc. I am referring rather to a dif-
ferent range of transdisciplinary and transregional strategies that eventually became lodged
within social scientific thought as disciplines crystallized.
2. While not discussing the phraseology of “discourses of vision” per se, there is an interesting
elaboration of the problem of the object or field of study in reference to the label “visual cul-
ture” in Bal (2003). Bal elaborates the inherent difficulty in defining an object of study or a dis-
cipline without at the same time relying upon a widespread visual essentialism that remains
tautological and that would still beg the question.
3. It is important to recognize that this arises in multiple Platonic texts including The Sophist
and Timeaus amid the complicated question of whether one could “identify” or point to non-being
if it was non-being.
redirectedFrom=empiricalmethod.
oed.com/view/Entry/65368?rskey=ypDPWd&result=1
6. At least here modifying what were previously coded as revelations into being coded as egoic
projections of an unconscious.
7. Readers interested in pursuing further the separation of truth from knowledge should consult
Foucault’s The Order of Things and his later Hermeneutics of the Subject where he maps different
relationships between savoir, consciencia and the subject from ancient Greece through to
post-Christian thought, with the Gnostic exception.
8. These possibilities in regard to psychology in the United States have already been discussed in
depth in Baker (2012b).
9. This included impact on an educational field in at least four areas:
(1) behaviour management strategies—a hard and soft versions such as disability-treatment
interventions and advice for citizen-production through behavior management of “the nor-
mals”; (2) contouring of expertise and authority, such as determining how a particular trial was
to be conducted and evaluated; (3) reintroducing the focus on Will in intelligence testing and
child development theories—hypnotic suggestibility was initially taken as a sign of weakness
because Will was seen as too easily bent by others, yet educability had to also go through Will
if stimulus-response frameworks were to be contested; and (4) the redefinition of public and
private via extending the domain of public inspection to a new area, the “psyche” and “uncon-
scious” (Baker, 2010).
10. Visible/invisible is understood here as becoming binary within a modern episteme, not as
intrinsically or inevitably so. See further Poovey (1998) and Clark (2007) for how such a
binary shapes a variety of Western disciplines from economics, sociology and laboratory
science to art history.
11. While James’ work is often associated with the term pragnamtic, which he popularized
from Charles Peirce, it is not the relevant frame for understanding his investment and
investigations in psychical research and thus not the focus here. See Baker (2012b) for fur-
ther analysis of his psychical research and its economies of affection outside pragmatist
thought.
12. Elaborated analysis of James’ work in teacher education, abnormal psychology and psychical
research from the lenses of postcolonial studies can be found in Baker (2012b).
data/
14. Readers interested in different theories and analytics of power can see Baker (2001). This text
substitutes the availability of power and its analytics from Plato through to a Foucauldian analyt-
ics of power-as-effects, the latter of which both foregrounds and differs from the notion of net-
worked power in Cooper Ramo (2016).
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Authenticity, aims and authority: Navigating youth participatory action research in the classroom

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ABSTRACT
Motivated by the addition of a curriculum standard for active citizenship into New Jersey’s social studies standards a group of educators and researchers set out to integrate an action research curriculum, based on a youth participatory action research (YPAR) model, into social studies classrooms. Adapting YPAR, with its promising blend of critical thinking, civic engagement, and democratization, for use as in the classroom is appealing to those seeking to use education as a means of social change. But activism does not always translate neatly to the classroom; melding multiple purposes into one approach, particularly amidst the current push for standardization and accountability measures, is complex. This analysis considers three challenges to navigate when redeploying YPAR into a curriculum for classroom use - preserving authenticity, conflicting aims, and tensions around authority. Drawing upon qualitative data from the social studies classrooms of two public high schools, this article engages directly with the difficulties inherent in adapting a methodology premised on action, authenticity, and youth empowerment to the adult driven, extrinsically oriented, skills and content-focused world of the classroom. Understanding this shift, and the epistemological tensions underlying it, is essential for those wishing to integrate action research with youth into social studies classrooms.

Proponents of youth participatory action research (YPAR) describe it in various ways: as a research approach that reveals underrepresented knowledge (Gusfield, 2009; Tuck, 2009); a pedagogy for teaching students critical inquiry skills (Camarota & Romero, 2009; Slovall & Delgado, 2009); a vehicle for empowerment through which youth turn marginalizing experiences into strengths and become activists (Rodriquez & Brown, 2009); and an epistemology that levels power imbalances between youth and adults (Mirra, Garcia, & Morell, 2015; Torre, 2005; Zeller-Berkman, 2011). The multifaceted goals of YPAR both entice and challenge social justice educators. The idea of applying this activist research approach, with its promising blend of critical thinking, empowerment, and democratization, to classroom pedagogy is appealing to educators seeking to use education as a means of social change. But activism does not always translate neatly to the

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