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Provincializing Curriculum? On the Preparation of Subjectivity for Globality

An essay review of

“On the Origins of the Educational Terms Class and Curriculum”

and

Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation

by

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The recent availability of international forums devoted expressly to discussing subfields of education such as curriculum studies has brought to visibility preexisting flashpoints that are not easily defused by strict adherence to definition of key terms. The difficulty of translating the term curriculum into “non”-Indo-European root languages, as well as among them, is a case in point and not just an issue of vocabulary. The difficulty of translation indexes a cleavage that is beyond-conceptual and exo-technical. Efforts to locate analogs or equivalents might suggest on the one hand, an ethnocentric preoccupation to extend the reach of a provincial concept (i.e., curriculum), while the effort to avoid or move to the side of such a preoccupation for translation might suggest structures of subjectivity that refuse co-option into foreign frames of reference. Both of these possibilities are, however, constitutive of and pointing to productive interstices from which to reengage and rephrase the weight given to subjectivity and language, to global/local divisions, and to the politics of traveling discourses in educational research.
This essay review emanates from such interstices to rethink commonsensical, everyday-ish and/or overexposed appeals to subjectivity and language, globality (and the attendant localizations), and traveling discourses in relation to curriculum (and curriculum studies). The analysis elaborates the important complexities—and limits—of efforts to provincialize curriculum, hence the question mark in the title, which in turn overflows onto broader theoretical quandaries that index the aporia at the heart of both grand educational narratives about nation-state, self, and place, and their critiques. That is, the analysis opens implicitly onto (among other possibilities) the spirit and interrogations already inherent in Dipesh Chakrabarty’s (2000) *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*. Here, Chakrabarty considers whether it is possible to write any kind of history that is not already European at some level. If the discipline of history has its discursive origins there and if key terms of analysis such as the human, the political, justice, equality, and so forth spring from such a philosophically-, theologically-, and temperospatially restricted origin then what precisely is the nature of the difference being observed in “non”-European historical narratives? If the provincialism of such cosmologies within Europe was spread in the guise of the universal, the objective, and the standard, “whether by colony, conquest, or trade” as MacLeod (2000) puts it, then is the historian outside Europe ever really outside, ever in excess of such a normative frame of reference and its onto-theo-philosophical baggage? Even while Chakrabarty notes no matter how varied within, irreconcilable, irreducible and anti-essentializable the borders to Europe and European heritages might be or have been, there is still something claimed as Europe and as origin both in his analysis and in popular culture and policy texts. This claim or perhaps homogenizing assertion holds a particularly tight and circular relation to what it means to know, to knowledge claims altogether, which helps to form the gnarly knot of logocentrism that Chakrabarty tries to disentangle in his historical study of Hindu Bengalese in northern India—a similar sense of encompassment (the relation between structuralism, rationalism, and the im/possibility of being outside) to which Foucault (1973) devoted his analysis in *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* and which has found its parallel in international educational research forums as well: Amid their subtle questioning of Autio’s (2007) dysconscious reduction of European curriculum studies to a German/Scandinavian axis and inflation of Bildung as a curriculum theory and worldwide master discourse, Christodoulou and Philippou (2008, p. 5) pondered from the vantage point of educational research in Cyprus whether internationalizing curriculum studies was imperialist and invited further dialogue over whether it was possible or desirable to “fit the context and advance the field by internationalizing in culturally sensitive ways.”

I want to approach such conundrum from yet another vantage point, especially because knowledge claims sit at the heart of much curriculum
studies scholarship, and especially because there has been in such transna-
tional debates several recurring presumptions, including that knowledge is
reducible to place, that the apparent problem of Otherness, whether con-
ceived as outside or within, is the problem of knowing the Other, and that
language constitutes the most legitimate form of knowing: “the world of
which organisms have more or less ‘accurate’ representations depending
on the sophistication of their filtering mechanisms—is, despite appear-
ances, referenced to an idealism founded on the fantasy that human lan-
guage is sovereign in its mastery of the multiplicity and contingency of the
world—the fantasy . . . that there is such a thing as non(self)decon-
structible observation” (Wolfe, 2003, p. 89). While I do not have room here
to unpack the richness and the depth of this fantasy, these associations, and
what they have made possible and foreclosed, I do want to offer some notes
on several aspects that relate to provincializing curriculum, to conditions of
possibility for subjectivity (and the contemporary explicit link to language),
and for subjectivity conceived in terms of globality in which belief in one
World-Historical system of which human nations constitute differently
located parts was produced.1

Provincializing curriculum offers two irresolvable possibilities that are
put into indirect contact below, not as counterposed or as tensions, not as
part of the same neighborhood or as allies, but as that which cut obliquely
across the shapes they have helped produce and contest. In the first layer of
analysis, provincializing raises the specificity of the term curriculum, that is,
its reemergence in nonuniversal timespaces and references the onto-theo-
philosophical baggage this involved. This is achieved here through a
rereading of David Hamilton’s watershed essay “On the Origins of the
Educational Terms Class and Curriculum.” Hamilton’s essay is a transfor-
mative piece of scholarship that resembles a history of the present. Drawn
from his Towards a Theory of Schooling (1989), the chapter has recently been
reprinted in its own right in New Curriculum History (Baker, 2009) with his
retrospective and commentary, 20 years on, published alongside. The
chapter maps when and how and under what conditions the terms class and
curriculum become redeployed in university-based texts of the 1500s and
1600s in different parts of Europe, and the effects of these intellectual
and institutional realignments. It thus discusses how such terms are avail-
able today as commonsensical administrative and pedagogical concepts in
anglophone literature. In the second layer of analysis, appeals to provin-
cializing curriculum suggests a further necessary deconstruction of this very
analytical move to provincialize, insofar as the specificity of timespace to
which notions of provincializing are subtly indebted remain embedded at
some level in modern geographical discourse, analytical strategies that
privilege empiricism, and even contemporary appeals to nationalism. While Chakrabarty remains cognizant of such circularities, referring to
them as a necessary and inadequate play of Eurocentric concepts in an
historical narrative, the tendency to reduce such complexities to a call for
more localized analyses in educational research can reduce or miss the logocentrism that operates, especially where appeals to a global/local binary are vaunted as the salve to homogenization, standardization, imperialism, neoliberalism, and so forth. Such dilemmas are, then, elaborated here through a rereading of Thongchai Winichakul’s *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation*, an original and intricately layered historical geography of the making of Thai nationhood and of maps in Southeast Asia in which older and newer strategies for world-building collided in what Winichakul calls premodern Siam.

This reconsideration of heritages and disciplines that do not ordinarily address each other offers analytical leverage on how integral educational and geographical discourse has been to the very belief in subjectivity at all, to the preparation of subjectivity for globality, and to the unspoken foundations that operate in contemporary analyses of traveling discourses and/or the difficulty of translation that is often observed en route. In reapproaching the (non)translatability of the term *curriculum* (and *curriculum studies*) and the question of whether curriculum studies can be seen as internationalizing, as a new form of cultural imperialism, or as something else altogether (e.g., as always already hybrid, etc.), then, my final focus is not directly on the question of international/imperial/something else or on a summary of theoretical approaches to conceptions of Otherness, but on that of place or rather space, that is, on some discursive events that have induced belief in World as macrospace sequenced across borders which link and divide designated locales and makes possible belief in subjectivity, in globality, and in the attendant structural if not mathematical possibilities and limits for modern comparative analysis of World’s apparent parts: same, different, same and different, neither. My commentary here thus points to complexities, limits, and problems that Hamilton and Winichakul both directly address and provide implicit lenses onto, including questioning the reducibility of World to globality, the solidity of the nation-state as a priori sovereign of education and manager of language, and bringing further into question the universal applicability of appeals to curriculum and of a coherent, conscious, unified, and discrete self with a single life as curriculum’s target. Such themes could be initially (mis)taken as an extension of what Peter Wagner (1993) describes as “the second crisis of modernity” in so-called Western political systems (1960s onward) in which tensions between liberty and discipline become more broadly exposed and where the very fabric and nature of authority is rewritten. Crucial to what I cannot address explicitly here, though, is how this apparent crisis and claims to modernity are part of the problem of an already-signified globe, not simply about history, sociology, science, or authority, neither who nor what—rather this analysis, its openings, limits and occlusions, provide signposts toward a necessary speechlessness that has nothing to do with voice and yet still has plenty to say.
It has become so commonsensical to think of a school in terms of separate classes and in many settings to think of curriculum in relation to classes that such terms can operate somewhat ahistorically and naturalistically in research, policy, and pedagogy. Moreover, social science and humanities scholarship is not used to inspecting such events as school structures and curricula for potential implication in globality’s formation, as a condition of possibility for marking new arrangements in cosmos and polis that foreshadow today’s almost incessant appeals to globalization, rendering globalization a virtually moribund descriptor, like nature, biology, culture, and the social before it. These are two of the many possible realizations that can be drawn out and elaborated via Hamilton’s meticulous research.

Hamilton’s analysis traces how the terms class and curriculum became institutionally linked terms, and were then appropriated into educational vocabularies to the point that they appear not to have a history at all, at least relative to terms such as teaching machine which more immediately mark their historicity. He maps the coming-into-being of the now taken-for-granted, the definition of the school as an organizational structure in which separate classes are instituted, noting via Mir’s 1968 Aux Sources de la Pédagogie des Jésuites the enormity of this invention and its erasure as one: “The division of pupils into classes was to constitute one of the principal pedagogic innovations in the entire history of education.”

The organization of teaching into classes of pupils occurs noticeably, without it being named as such, in both the University of Paris and in the schools of the Brethren of the Common Life in the 16th century. Hamilton argues that the organizational innovation to put pupils into groups by advancement in age and complexity of content occurs as part of the relocation of authority and new strategies of social control. In medieval forms, school had two meanings—both a chamber of instruction and the group of pupils within it. The advent of charitable houses, such as the house of Sorbonne, for poor students who could then board to study at the University of Paris redefined what a school was, that is, something built around separate units of day students and boarding students. This innovation was followed by the acceptance in such charitable houses of fee-paying students, which was followed by a breakdown of residential schooling under the belief that they were becoming hotbeds of anti-royalist and anti-state sentiments. Surveillance and regulation of day pupils then took on new forms, in terms of monitoring student attendance and inspecting student progress through the material presented, neither of which was a strict part of the medieval expectation.

By the second decade of the 16th century the divisions of pupils into distinct and stabilized groups was considered both an administrative and pedagogic innovation to the extent that it led scholars such as Goulet and Erasmus to adopt a new language of schooling. The word class, redeployed
from Quintilian’s earlier usage, emerged not as a substitute for school but as reference to subdivisions within it. This carried the connotations of a Renaissance belief that learning in general and municipal schooling in particular would be more efficiently promoted through smaller pedagogic units. Thus, the response to a 15th-century crisis of administration and government evinced new patterns of organization and control. Renaissance educators extended these arguments to a closer pedagogic supervision of students, and the term *class* became readily adapted to these new circumstances—significantly, the term *class* carried the belief that every learning had its time and place.

**CURRICULUM**

Hamilton notes that relative to the term *class*, however, the term *curriculum* has been less researched in regard to its origins, citing Rashdall’s observation in 1936 in *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*: “It is hardly possible to exaggerate the importance of this innovation [the very idea of a curriculum] in the history of education” (p. 3). The reemergence of the term *curriculum* was a response to the problem of internal articulation of classes—how could the different factions of a school be fitted together and managed as a whole, and indeed why was it presumed that they needed to be? As Pinar, Slattery, Reynolds, and Taubman (1995) note, curriculum derives from the Latin *currere*, meaning a racecourse or track. Significantly, we are to understand this track not as linear but as circular, where the ending meets back up with the beginning, the emphasis on the journey. Hamilton notes curriculum’s reemergence at the University of Leiden in 1582 and the University of Glasgow in 1633, the connection between them being that both universities were established for the training of Protestant Calvinist ministers. At first mention in these university records, curriculum referred to the entire multiyear course followed by a student, not to any shorter pedagogic unit—one would complete the curriculum of one’s studies, for example, not simply the mathematics curriculum or some more delimited program.

Hamilton hypothesizes that what facilitated the uptake of the term *curriculum* in relation to the new administrative structure of classes was an affinity between Ramism and Calvinism, especially in the Low Countries, something that other scholars such as Walter Ong in their histories of literacy and print have left unexplored. This confirmed the idea that the different elements of an educational course were to be treated as all-of-a-piece, embodying both *disciplina* (a sense of structural coherence) and *ordo* (a sense of structural sequencing). Crucially, post-Renaissance, then, curriculum means structural wholeness and sequential completeness—a curriculum should not only be followed, it should be finished. It was reference to something considered all-of-a-piece and that could be subdivided within
itself. Hamilton points out, for instance, that whereas the sequence, length and completeness of medieval courses had been relatively open to negotiation (e.g., at the University of Bologna), curriculum’s redeployment brought a greater sense of control of teaching and learning. In the 16th-century debates, it was *ordo* that was emphasized more than *disciplina*, and a pivotal connection seems to have been the linking of ideas about order with a change in meaning of the term *method*.

Methodus had denoted in the medieval era procedures of investigation or analysis. It did not convey a sense of providing guidelines that could be rapidly assimilated, easily applied, templated and lifted out. Method existed as a leisurely intellectual art, not a purposive science of technique. Via Renaissance dialecticians such as Ramus, however, method was redefined. The very nature of dialectics changed to make it easier for students to extract and apply the “truths” embedded in the writings and speeches of great thinkers. Accordingly, techniques were reduced to a form that could be easily communicated. This reformulation of dialectic in the direction of concise sequencing and ease of communication gave method its new linearity. It becomes fully realized in the work of Ramus who highlighted the intellectual generalizability and pedagogical relevance of the dialectical method, claiming that it was appropriate not merely to the philosophical arts, but to “every matter which we wish to teach easily and clearly.”

This brought an unprecedented orderliness to teaching and the connection between *order, efficiency, and improvement* became fundamental to late 16th- and early 17th-century school reform. Reformed schooling became the means by which human beings might be brought to natural perfection. Method becomes connected to curriculum via Calvinism and through the work of Sturm and Melanchthon, Ramus’s ideas spread to what is now called Germany, to those areas most tinged by Calvinism, and into Calvinist sections of the Netherlands. In Calvinist educational proposals the Ramist idea of method with its overtones of orderliness could fulfill the same position of centrality as discipline already held within Calvinist social practice. What happens to secure this link is unclear, however. Calvinists had previously used the terms *stadium* and *cursus* to refer to things such as a life course. Hamilton hypothesizes that a mutual attraction between Ramism and Calvinism lay in the general need for well-ordered social organization, a rule of life as the essence of Calvinism, in which as Calvin put it, “the body of the church, to cohere well, must be bound together by discipline as by sinews.” The reappearance of the term *vitae curriculum* in Calvinist communities may have facilitated the deployment of the single term *curriculum* in educational institutions, but this remains speculative: either way, it is in Leiden and Glasgow that the term *curriculum* reemerges in university records in the midst of sorting out conflict over civic versus presbytery control of the university.

Hamilton concludes that the cumulative effect of these institutional and intellectual rearrangements was that learning and teaching, for good or for
ill, became more amenable to external scrutiny and control; second, that this occurred as education became available to a wider section of the population; and third, that this expectation for education was linked to a series of Protestant decrees which asserted that all children regardless of rank or gender should be evangelized through the medium of schooling. Together, the two waves of pedagogic reform that Hamilton locates as responses to 16th-century crises of authority—the introduction of subdivisions within a school and its allied closer surveillance of pupils on the one hand and the refinement of pedagogic content and method on the other—enabled the adoption of the terms class and curriculum and their repetitive linking.

This linking has occurred to the point that today in anglophone literature, for example, it becomes difficult to see such terms as having a history at all, let alone how arbitrary and provincial the recasting of medieval schooling was around the concerns of the Christian Reformation and Counter-Reformation, and, how transformative the invention of modern, compulsory schooling has been. Curriculum’s deployment especially has both contracted and expanded ever since, on the one hand referring to shorter courses of study, subject matter, and largely formal or planned content and broadening to references beyond university settings, such as now involving notions of “understanding curriculum as text” and the politics of knowledge even beyond formal and organized educational structures (Baker, 2009; Pinar et al., 1995). On the basis of Hamilton’s approach and contemporary deployments, then, one can rightly ask do “we” organize curriculum and classes or does this history organize “us”?

ALL-OF-A-PIECE?

A response to such a question requires digging deeper for shifts in the conceptualization of reality that the Reformation and Counter-Reformation especially ushered in. It is important to first recall from the above the novelty of the idea that every learning has its time and place that accompanied the subdivision of a school into classes and that curriculum’s reference to sequencing activities across a life course was associated with (predestined) salvation in a Calvinist afterlife, the quest for a highly organized human perfection awaiting the next Coming of Christ. The formation of a new kind of imaginal domain, a new macrospace can be glimpsed here, one that contains a reworked relation between the thisworldly and the otherworldly and that redefines human agency. Significantly, the human can and must be worked upon, by themselves and with the right tools such as the new dialectics, to methodically unfold this perfection. The human must account for themselves and be externally scrutinized, via their performance in a set time and place of learning, within the overarching
concern of Christian doxology that linked the specificity and singularity of placebound time of education on earth to the heavenly afterlife. Post-Reformation and pre-Descartes this refurbished move of the infinite and the otherworldly into the finite—the God who is considered to dwell within each and who thus does not require an interlocutor for access—structures new possibilities for being in a chain of Being, for relationships, for the very recognition of what constitutes authority, and for governance. The redefinition of one’s relationship to God, miracles, and saints shook a relatively closed cosmos with an absolutist authority in the form of papacy and monarchy, challenging such absolutism and closure via the advent of “difference,” by the possibility of Reformed interpretations spawned by vernacular Biblical text as just one instance. The concern for managing the school as a whole once fragmented into classes, for sequencing a before with an after and calling it curriculum, for developing analytical templates that could travel and standardize the interpretive strategies across texts and calling it method and dialectics alludes, in turn, however, to a dis-ease with heterogeneity that reading the Bible for oneself had also generated. In this light, the Reformation and Counter-Reformation arguably signal the beginning of that moment when “West” is asserted as different from “the rest,” when, for instance, religion, science, and philosophy begin the journey of becoming separate pursuits and disciplines, when subject more noticeably dissociates from World, when madness and reason move into an oppositional position in regard to truth-production, and when language becomes distinct from nature, a rational system of expression rather than an expression of a natural system (Foucault, 1961/1965). It would appear that over the next several centuries, which is relatively fast given the stranglehold, the otherworldly as a frame of reference and advanced organizer became subjugated within a series of related public/private, rational/irrational, empirical/mystical, introspective/externally verifiable splits. While subjugation does not mean disappearance or the halt of an operation, it is fair to say, as Wynter (1995) has argued, that the versions of administration between Old World and New World had changed from Latin-based Church-centered governance where religion was the State to seemingly secularized vernacular-based administration where religion became one of several arms of the State—a shift from the spirit to the flesh, from Religion to Race as the central category of perception.

What is often missed, however, in Christocentric narratives focused on the pluralized foreground, that is, on competing Christian sects, is the pluralized background—the extent to which Christianity in its explicit multiplicity also sought implicit distinction from sects within the other Abrahamic traditions, Judaism and Islam, as well as from so-called pre-Christian pagan cosmologies. This has led to a series of debates over what the projection of West, allied to the colonial practices of New World formation, actually is or achieved—is the West primarily Christian and European in origin or is the West the outcome of the meeting of Greco-
Roman cosmologies with the Semitic traditions, the cross-fertilization of the Abrahamic cosmologies that defined themselves within and against each other in a partially shared symbolic universe indebted to monotheism, or is the West an imperialist projection fortified against a similarly projected Orient whose perceived exteriority constitutes from within what is Western (Said, 1979/2000; Sells, 1994)? What has also sometimes been missed amid such debates and the acknowledgments of what Derrida (1968/1982) calls onto-theo-philosophy—the interpenetration of the ontological, theological, and philosophical heritages that have now been referred to as Occidentalism—is how utterly potent a West, Science, and Nation trilogy became within a thisworldly-oriented template, emerging as contemporaneous and interlinked delimitations in new modes of thought, social practices, and institution-building.

Efforts to conjoin global studies, postcolonial studies, and science and medicine studies have elaborated this intersection, underscoring how an alliance between realism, rationality, and colonialism shaped new claims to World, and to developmentalized views of a flattened and planar One Totality. For Warwick Anderson (2002), for instance, the question is no longer so much who owned or invented which device or worldview but more urgently how things such as science travel: “The postcolonial study of science and technology suggests a means of writing a ‘history of the present,’ of coming to terms with the turbulence and uncertainty of contemporary global flows of knowledge and practice. As Stacy Leigh Pigg puts it, ‘we now need to find out more about how science and technology travel, not whether they belong to one culture or another’” (p. 644). For Itty Abraham (2006), however, we can only name places as nations or identify cultures as discrete because of the invention of sciences.

Modernity, nation, and later, state all pass through and are interpellated in the institutions and cultures of modern western science. However, colonial and later postcolonial science was always a contradictory formation. Though science presents itself as universal knowledge, it is never able to do so unambiguously in a location distant from its putative origins in Western Europe. Science’s conjoint history with colonial and imperial power implies a constant representation of its condition in order to pass as universal knowledge in the colony. (p. 211)

Taking a different tack, Thongchai Winichakul argues that we only have modernity, nation, state, and science because of something else—particular notions of time and space that have enabled historians to take for granted what a state is: “One of the major questions yet haunting the historians of early Southeast Asia concerns the formation of states. To be more specific, how one can talk about a state’s formation without taking for granted what a state is—the criteria usually prescribed by social scientists, not by Southeast Asian peoples themselves” (Winichakul, 1994, p. 14). This a priori certainty seems to inhere in state theories wherever they arise:
An orthodox king-and-battle history assumes a static old-fashioned definition of the Thai nation-state and applies it to the past. An alternative history proposes dynamism and process but only according to certain scholastic criteria found outside the history it describes. Indeed, scholars have tried throughout the history of European nation-states to determine the true and natural constitution of a nation, that is, the truth of the identity of it. The entire history of a nation presumes the existence of such an entity or presupposes a definite qualification of it, as if its identity were already given. (Winichakul, 1994, p. 14)

Whereas Bénédicte Anderson (1991) points to a new temporal consciousness that helped to formulate the sense of a shared community in historical lineage, (as distinct from previous imagined communities), that is, populations gained a new sense of time as homogeneous and linear and this helped to shape the imagined community of the nation-state via appeals to historical narratives. Winichakul focuses on another technology—the geo-body, describing the operations of technology of territoriality which created nationhood spatially. For Winichakul, the displacement of indigenous spatial concepts by modern geographical ones produced social institutions and practices that created nationhood. Whereas belief in linear time provided the connective sinews, the form of sequencing that permitted nation-states to appear homogeneous and unified, that is around, the same calendar, just different special or celebratory days marking it, the geo-body, the technology of territoriality and mapping, allowed another form of sequencing to take hold. Modern geographical concepts produced the idea that we are all a part of the same spatial whole, just differently located on the map.

The changes that this new spatialized understanding and notion of Worldhood as global macrospace rendered cannot be underestimated. Winichakul’s account is important to revisit, then, in part because it historicizes this change and in part because it can be extrapolated toward understanding how the nationhoods that were created in Southeast Asia were not necessarily in tension with Church-centered governance as in Euro-based religion versus science accounts, but rather an outcome of a religion-science affiliation, one that positions secularism and modern sciences as torsions within Christian traditions rather than radically opposed to them (King, 1999). The peculiar mix between missionary projects, empire-building and empiricism, and a superiority complex grounded in distinct Christian beliefs creates the conditions for clash of what Winichakul calls old and new conceptions of space in premodern Siam. It is obvious but also crucial that it was not Southeast Asians who went to Europe to tell Europeans how to live or conceive of World. The presumption of a right to do that, of an entitlement mentality, thus comes out of a particular set of cosmologies that structure such actions as moral and well intended for the actor even when received and experienced as precisely the opposite in locations distant from such cosmologies’ putative origins, as Abraham (2006, see quote above) puts it. This radically insular and Indo-
Aryan order of things in which operated very restricted and exclusivist criteria for the recognition of suffering in another underlies, among other things, some common misinterpretations of mapping methods and conceptions of space in Southeast Asia.

Winichakul notes, for instance, that the absence of the concept of physical boundaries in what he refers to as premodern Siam has been especially undertheorized or misplaced: “No study has been done on the relationships—either the transformation or shift or confrontation—between the premodern geographical discourse and the modern one. The absence of definite boundaries of the premodern realm of Siam is not taken seriously, as if it were due to some practical or technical reason” (Winichakul, 1994, p. 18).

Most studies of premodern Thai concepts of space indicate that maps were not always conceived as travel aids but as ways of representing relations between sacred entities tied to Buddhist doxology. Such studies tend to focus on the Buddhist cosmography known as the Traiphum cosmography. Traiphum, literally meaning three worlds, was an important doctrinal tradition within Theravada Buddhism. The best-known text of this tradition is Traiphum Phra Ruang, located by historians as the major treatise of the Sukhotahi kingdom in the upper Chao Phraya valley in the 13th century. There are 31 levels in the three worlds in which the human level is simply one and in this format, beings are classified by merit and designated to live in particular levels according to their store of merit. The store of merit can be accumulated or diminished by one’s deeds and account for one’s next birth. By this logic, one’s present existence is the outcome of the previous one. While the surviving texts give concrete descriptions of the three worlds and especially the human one, as well as movements of the sun, moon, and seasonal changes, space is conceptualized in the Traiphum as a qualitative manifestation of existence, merit, and the relation between sacred entities (Winichakul, 1994).

Winichakul’s analysis is dedicated, then, to the question “what dramatic effects ensue when people stop imagining space in terms of orderly relations of sacred entities and start conceiving it with a whole new set of signs and rules?” (Winichakul, 1994, p. 36). As for the variety of premodern maps, modern geography for Winichakul is not objective but it has real effects and is a kind of mediator. Earth and modern maps are not given objects, just out there. Rather modern geography is just one kind of knowledge, a conceptual abstraction of a supposedly objective reality, a systematic set of signs, a discourse. In analyzing premodern and modern discourses of space and detecting those moments when the new and the old collided issues of “specificity” arise, but not in terms of what specificity might mean in concepts such as provincializing which often automatically assume specificity to mean precise time and place. Rather, the very concern for measurement, accuracy, and empiricism, (and/or realism, rationality and colonialism) present themselves as foreign.
Premodern maps had no interest in the accuracy of measurements and required no scientific, empirical methods. A map merely illustrated the fact or truth that had been known already, either cosmography, moral teaching, or a traveling route. A modern map, on the contrary, dismisses the imaginary and sacred approaches to the profane world. It constitutes the new way of perceiving space and provides new methods of imagining space which prevent the “unreal” imagination and allow only legitimate space to survive after the decoding process. (Winichakul, 1994, p. 55)

As Winichakul notes, though, the human world of the Traiphum has been treated as if it were the native’s view of the planet earth, a distorted or primitive one, contaminated by false belief or lack of knowledge. It is doubtful, however, whether the symbolic representation was in fact designed to represent the planet earth. The fact that depictions of earth are varied, for example, square and flat and round, does not indicate the development of local knowledge of the earth or the lack of it. More probably, it suggests that the materiality of the human world can be imagined in more than one way, whereas the spiritual meaning of the three worlds must be obeyed. Under this view, the spiritual dimension is the reality of the Traiphum space, and the most important knowledge needed to be transmitted correctly.

Moreover, there were other indigenous conceptions of space, at least four, including the concept of a profane, material earth in which small localities or military routes via rivers were depicted. If one concedes that a map does not have to be a representation of the earth’s surface, but can depict other relations, it is easier to understand that different representations were developed for different purposes. Maps of the earth’s surface for travel purposes, as opposed to cosmographic ones, drew upon traditions from what is now called China for mapping coastal areas and in which land was always depicted either at the top or bottom of the page. These traditions gave way to techniques of mapping familiar in Europe through the influence of the Jesuits in the 16th and 17th centuries. Different maps with different ideas about spaces thus coexisted and the crucial point here is that this suggests that there was not simply one way to represent World but rather that there was more than one world, more than one imaginal domain.

There were several discourses on space existing in the field of premodern geographical knowledge. Each of them operated in a certain domain of human affairs and everyday life . . . there were terrains of knowledge within which particular conceptions operated; beyond their limits, other kinds of knowledge came into force. The knowledge of certain villages and towns might have been operating at the local levels. The space of the Strategic Map or the Coastal Map might have had an effect on commanders of troops and Chinese merchants. Yet such knowledge might have been called into operation only in a military exercise, in administrative works, or for maritime trade. But when people thought or talked about Siam, the kingdom of Vientiane, or China, another kind of spatial conception might have come to mind. And when they thought or talked about the earth or the world they
live in, the picture of the *Traiphum* might have preoccupied their minds. Like many other concepts in human life today and yesterday, shifts from one kind of knowledge to another or from one domain of spatial conception to another are not uncommon. (Winichakul, 1994, p. 33)

The imaginability of a nation in terms of linear time and a modern geographical map involves a number of changes, then, beyond vocabulary—especially in concepts/practices concerning the domain and limits of a country. The most important precondition, however, is the conception/practice of boundary lines, which distinguish one unit of sovereign space from another. Being represented by this code meant entering a new kind of earth space, which had another set of rules and conventions, another mode of relations. If a map is more than a recording or reflecting medium, then as Winichakul rightly points out the transformation may be more complex than anyone might expect.

In particular, it is the conception/practice of boundary lines that bring to noticeability the bizarre new way of coding “earth” that literally transforms what it means to be alive. Read against the *Traiphum* alone, drawing boundary lines also entailed the centering of the human, the encoding of desire, the building of nations and ethnicities as political entities whose boundaries define identity and whose prime directive must be to reproduce within.

Boundary lines are indispensable for a map of a nation to exist—or to put it another way, a map of a nation presupposes the existence of boundary lines. Logically, this inevitably means that boundary lines must exist before a map, since a medium simply records and refers to an existing reality. But in this case, the reality was a reversal of that logic. It is the concept of a nation in the modern geographical sense that requires the necessity of having boundary lines clearly demarcated. A map may not just function as a medium; it could well be the creator of the supposed reality. . . . The boundary of a nation works in two ways at the same time. On the one hand, it sets a clear-cut limit on a sovereign unit; on the other, it imposes a sharp division between at least two units of space. . . . Consequently, many conceptions and practices of interstate relations must be changed to conform with the new geography of a country. The indigenous concepts must be displaced. (Winichakul, 1994, p. 56)

The collision of mapping techniques in Southeast Asia is instructive, then, in at least two ways that are relevant here. First, in premodern techniques (Winichakul problematizes and trades on the term *premodern*), the object was not to understand one’s self as a smaller unit within a wider whole that constituted the background for one’s present location. Second, the importance of the shift into a “global plane of reference” is that the spatial reality that the modern map purports to present is never directly experienced in its totality—it is impossible to do so, no one can be “the earth”—so the modern map is an indispensable mediator in perceiving and conceptualizing such macrospace as though it is a totality, a function that
none of the premodern maps ever performed. This dramatically transforms
the meaning that one can give to Being or to relationships, for instance
(including relationships called power relations) as well as introduces new
strategies of representation that become naturalized and whose naturalness
is made unfamiliar via other strategies: “The isolation of a piece of the
earth’s surface from the entire globe might be compared to the isolation of
the earth from the whole galaxy in our minds today. In other words, the
classification of a local geography and the whole globe as separate catego-
ries in the indigenous knowledge about space is comparable to the separate
classification in modern science today of geography and astronomy or
astrophysics” (Winichakul, 1994, p. 31).

On Winichakul’s accounts, then, it would not be enough to ask when
does Thailand become Thailand or where do the borders fall in which
period when inquiring into the politics of curriculum’s translation or cur-
riculum studies and internationalization. Such questions remain within a
Newtonian physics and modern conception of geography that presumes
what should be explained—that is, the revolution into linear time, the
assumption that space is three dimensional, the presumption that there is
only one world totality, and that Being can only be defined by understand-
ing the self as one small part of macrospace.

The complexity of such transformations that Winichakul documents can
thus be considered alongside those which Hamilton historicized. For
Hamilton, schools became seen as discrete institutions to be regularly
attended, fixed in time and place, managed as a whole, with pupils subdi-
vided into classes, their activities being sequenced across the subdivisions
via a curriculum focused on methods that could be templated and applied
across texts and that was built out of an orientation to life as all-of-a-piece—
structural wholeness and sequential completeness. In the salvific quest for
perfection, the thisworldly and otherworldly did not remain foreign to each
other or become that which was practiced simply in the home while sus-
pended in public domains. Universities and schools were instruments of
religions within an awareness of the pluralized foreground and background
that incited the competition for souls in the first place. Subjectivity arises in
this broth of intellectual and institutional realignments as that which tries
to account for this plurality via an emergent subject/World fissure which, at
the same time that it wishes toward a new absolutism recognizes its failure,
the impossibility of totality given competing cosmologies. Yet, the mono-
theistic traditions as they winnow and sway in regard to the separation of
philosophy, religion, and science bequeath monism within territorial, dis-
ciplinary and analytical practices—a penchant for a single law, a single
cause, a single origin, a single race and language, a single life, a single self
and a unified consciousness. Recognition of the structural possibilities—
that two variables can also be said to interpenetrate once they are seen as
relatively discrete—incites a new range of theories around I and World,
from Kantian ambiguity over priority, to Bildung’s spiral, to the Rousseau
collective self, to the psychoanalytic unconscious as secret repository of World in the human subject.

Via Winichakul, however, one might say that the very arrangement of seeing things via I and World, with World becoming secularized and flattened to the globality of a World-Historical system, is one that had to be invented and spread. The geo-body was one technology that was involved, helping to produce the social institutions and practices that created nationhood in a similar way that the reemergence of the term *class* as a subdivision of pupils helped produce the idea of the modern school. Boundary lines created the units for sequencing national territoriality as though all were part of the same macrospace, just like the reemergence of the term *curriculum* where the new practice of sequencing educational experiences to be all-of-a-piece required boundary lines between groups of students and activities to be seen as a structural whole. Rather than honoring the three worlds of the *Traiphum* and the more than one imaginal domain available beyond it, modern geography and map making functioned in Southeast Asia (an appellation and descriptor that bespeaks this history) not in the quest for human perfection but in the introduction of the centrality of the human. Modern geography does not simply relocate the *Traiphum* worlds, for instance, into a new arrangement of cosmos and polis. Rather, it instantiates the very idea of polis and cosmos as separate but related realms that are integral to civic and personal governance, displacing indigenous conceptions of space and sacred entities as irreal, primitive, inaccurate, and immaterial. In the case of modern map making in premodern Siam, then, drawing lines was not just a technical task but an act of colonization which at that moment when there is a perhaps well-intended effort to “map the world” subjugates the possibilities already existing and in excess of simplistic appeals to the local, the provincial, and the specifically empirical.

**CONCLUSION: THE PREPARATION OF SUBJECTIVITY FOR GLOBALITY?**

If Hamilton illuminates how class, curriculum, and method participated in the preparation of subjectivity for globality in the form of a penchant for sequencing, for linking parts as though intrinsic and necessary to understanding and managing something taken a priori as a spirito-educational whole, then Winichakul highlights the very coming-into-being of “subjectivity” all together, the making of the subject as distinct from “environment,” the forceful assertion of human-to-human relations built around border maintenance on a profane earth as the most central experience and responsibility of the cogito-oriented self. In this light, it might be legitimate to ponder whether the (nontotalizable) Totality that the potent combination of Calvinism and Ramism produced in university settings might have been more effectively achieved ironically through the science of map.
making than reading the Bible for one’s self. The social practices that created nationhood, including the induction into historical narratives composed around homogenous conceptions of linear time, border lines, and three-dimensional space did not simply displace indigenous conceptions via Euro-cosmologies that could only imagine in a somewhat limited way a thisworld, an otherworld, and a single God but required a new conception of human Being as small and localizable within the big—a new scalar relation, a flattened plane, and a materialist planetary thinking in which merit is no longer related to a deed-based karmic inheritance but to a social consensus around the accuracy of measurements taken. The version of globality that modern map making creates and then further mediates, however, may have been indirectly and unintentionally prepared for via a monotheistic whole-part system of reasoning and new dependency on sequencing, in which social unrest led to demands for external scrutiny and new kinds of social control, resulting in audit trails that were to make visible the pathways between one activity and location and the next, whether pedagogical or financial, whether recorded in the curriculum vitae or on the new world map.

This concern for explicit and visible audit trails opens onto what Jean-Luc Nancy (2007) notes has since crystalized—a version of globality in which globe is conceptualized as a hermetically sealed unit, as a self without anything outside of itself. Rather than theorizing the interpenetrations of onto-theo-philosophy with which Derrida has been preoccupied, Nancy points instead to a withdrawal—the withdrawal of “God,” of an otherworldly domain, which he describes the conditions of possibility for rather than mourns. This withdrawal creates for Nancy a fact—the fact—from which reflection originates: the conditions in which the thisworldly is turned in on itself, intensifying internal comparisons (e.g., same, different, same and different, neither), are also the conditions of a globe destroying itself. This can be extrapolated to understanding how a thesis of a single life focused on the thisworld and concentrated in upon its immediate and materialist advantage becomes an effect and then a cause. In contrast, a Traiphum cosmology of three worlds where the prospect of reincarnation arises, meaning that one may have to reinhabit the “space” being occupied in the this-life and perhaps in different form, generates a broader sense of interconnectedness, responsibility, and agency—in a sense, the production of a karmic audit trail rather than a fiscal one. The otherworldly which inspired Calvinist quests for natural perfection can be seen under Nancy’s view, then, to have been displaced but not dishonored in the formation of West, Science, and Nation, while Theravada Buddhist Traiphum conceptions of space as relations between sacred entities were diminished and denigrated in different ways and with differential consequences within a new scientific conception of borders, the geo-body, and nationhood. Such events as the reemergence of class and curriculum and the invention of modern geography, far from reducible to a technologically inspired secu-
larization or globalization discourse, operated more as complex elaborations of Christian-inspired doxologies, fears and sublations; less as objectivist departures from spirit-matter quandaries that have never been resolved by appeals to empiricism or to Marxism, and more the refusal of “more than one imaginal domain.”

This brings to the fore, finally then, the confluence of issues with which this essay review began, of subjectivity and language, of globality, and the judgment of discursive events as traveling and/or as local. As Chambers alerts us to here, simply splitting the register between global and local may achieve little if done within the same configurations that are already privileged and overexposed.

The passion to eradicate alterity from the earth is also the passion for the home, the country, the dwelling, that authorizes this desire and rewards it. In its nationalism, parochialism and racism it constitutes a public and private neurosis. So, unwinding the rigid understanding of place that apparently permits me to speak, that guarantees my voice, my power, is not simply to disperse my locality within the wider coordinates of an ultimate planetary context. That would merely absolve me of responsibility in the name of an abstract and generic globalism, permitting my inheritance to continue uninterrupted in the vagaries of a new configuration. There is something altogether more precise and more urgent involved. For in the horror of the unhomely pulses the dread for the dispersal of Western humankind: the dread of a rationality confronted with what exceeds and slips its grasp. (Chambers, 2001, p. 196)

Hamilton and Winichakul’s insightful and painstaking analyses indicate how sociological approaches to globalization and curriculum studies might be better equipped, then, to understand their own possibility through a closer examination of religious, scientific, and philosophical heritages than simply tracing how money flows or science and technology travel across nations or between selves. In that regard, aporia would be encountered immediately in the undertaking of so-called transnational curriculum inquiry, not because the linguistic heritage and etymology of curriculum are delimited within a fantasy of language’s sovereignty over contingency, not because the difficulty of translation raises the issue of specificity of nation-as-place and self-as-locus, and not because the historico-anthropological parameters of schooling’s forced project at the compulsory or legislative level, and, the earlier conditions regarding class and curriculum’s uptake at the university level operated as relative solutions to a crisis of and in authority. Rather than delineating aporia so that uncertainty can paradoxically be clear to all and rather than mechanizing the means of their emergence, Hamilton and Winichakul’s texts artfully point toward the not-so-“motionless structures” that do “not resolve the ambiguity, but determine it” (Foucault, 1961/1965, p. xii), approaching a threshold of inarticulation, offering signposts toward spaces and worlds that continue to have value without being continuous, without fixed syntax, and where one
can yet still ask, “What realm do we enter which is neither history or knowledge, nor history itself; which is controlled neither by the teleology of truth nor the rational sequence of causes, since causes have value and meaning only beyond the division? A realm, no doubt, where what is in question is the limits rather than the identity of a culture” (Foucault, 1961/1965, p. xi).

NOTES

1. This effort involves, no doubt, a reliance on a spatializing language which ultimately operates as vehicle and effect of the very conditions being analyzed and outside of which this paper does not claim to fall.

2. In regard to Lutheranism, this is evidenced by Luther’s penning of Small Catechisms in an effort to standardize Biblical interpretation after his dismay at journeying through different regions of German-language Europe. See further Baker (2001). The differences between Calvinist and Lutheran heritages might be seen in vestigial form today in the educational systems of countries in Europe such as Scotland and Finland, respectively.

3. I have elaborated the beginnings of this disjunction between subject and World in medieval Christian poetics in its relation to a reworked discourse of nature and genius. See Baker (2005).

REFERENCES