Handbook of Research on Civic Engagement in Youth

Editors

Lonnie R. Sherrod

Judith Torney-Purta

Constance A. Flanagan

WILEY

John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

CHAPTER 5

Youth Civic Engagement: Normative Issues

PETER LEVINE

Tufts University

ANN HIGGINS-D'ALESSANDRO

Fordham University

THE RELEVANCE OF NORMATIVE PHILOSOPHY
TO YOUTH CIVIC ENGAGEMENT

EDUCATING YOUNG PEOPLE for citizenship is an intrinsically *norma-tive* task.[1] In other words, it is a matter of choosing and transmitting values to citizens so that they will build and sustain societies that embody particular forms of justice and virtue. Adults who teach history, civics, or social studies, who guide adolescents in community service projects, or who recruit youth as activists generally do so for normative reasons—because of values that they hold and wish to transmit. Likewise, most scholars who evaluate and study such work do so because of their own demanding moral principles. They have chosen to examine service-learning or youth organizing—instead of distance-learning or the stock market—because something about youth civic engagement strikes them as deeply valuable. Yet there is relatively little discussion of the precise normative reasons for particular forms of civic education in schools and other institutions or of the values that scholars bring to the work of evaluating such efforts. Higgins-D'Alessandro (this volume) addresses the latter issue.

This lack of explicit attention to normative reasons is unfortunate. Reasonable people have defined "good citizens" in various ways: for example, as dutiful members of communities, as independent critics of public institutions,

---

[1] We use the word *normative* to encompass what is ethical, just, fair, or moral—not as the antonym of *deviant*, nor as a synonym for *typical* or *average*.

as bearers of rights, and as proponents of social justice (Schudson, 1998; Westheimer & Kahne, 2004). Deciding which of these values to transmit is a public task in which everyone has a stake. Adults who lead or study civic education, or do both, have considerable influence over youth, who are not permitted to choose most of their educational experiences. As a matter of accountability, these adults ought to explain—both to the youth they serve and to other adults—which civic values and habits they are trying to develop, and why. In short, they should be willing to participate in a democratic discussion about their public work.

Second, explicit discussion of values can reveal the tradeoffs that often arise in civic education. One category of tradeoffs (as an example) involves quantity versus equality. Many voluntary programs attract adolescents who already have relatively strong commitments to civic engagement and relatively strong skills for civic and political participation. Student governments, for instance, usually draw students who are already on a leadership track. Those students tend to be successful in school and thus likely to hold privileged social positions as adults. Offering them civic opportunities may enhance their capacity to participate in politics and community affairs. That is a good result if we want to develop more experienced leaders in the next generation. But it is a bad outcome if we are mainly concerned about *equality* of civic participation by social class (McNeal, 1998).

Another type of tradeoff involves freedom versus moral authority. Even if it is desirable for young people to become tolerant, trusting, caring, and committed to the common good, there is a separate question about whether any particular group of adults (e.g., parents, teachers, policy-makers, or tax-payers) has a responsibility or a right to inculcate these values. Depending on one's theory of how power should be exercised in education, one might think that it is the duty of public school teachers to decide which values to inculcate in their students; or that they should teach only the values that elected officials select for public schools; or that they should try to leave value-questions to parents; or that communities of teachers and students should choose values democratically.

Third, we need normative reasons to address a vexing problem. When young people do not engage with a public institution (for example, when they do not vote), that could be because they lack some mental state that we wish they possessed, such as interest, knowledge, concern, confidence, or commitment. Or it could be because the institution is severely flawed and does not deserve to be engaged. (For instance, electoral districts in the United States have been drawn to discourage competition, thereby making most campaigns meaningless.) Whether to change young people's minds or reform institutions—or both—is a crucial issue that cannot be addressed without deciding what constitutes a just society.

Finally, explicit normative argumentation can provide persuasive reasons to invest in civic development—reasons that would otherwise be overlooked. Today, the default justification for any educational investment is its impact on individual students' long-term *human capital*: their value in the labor market, as revealed by their grades and degrees. There is evidence that some civic opportunities increase human capital. For example, mandatory service-learning in high school seems to improve students' grades and increases their likelihood of completing college (Dávila & Mora, 2007). However, many adults who organize such opportunities have defensible motives other than enhancing human capital. By elucidating these alternative reasons, we may be able to increase public support for civic development. We may also reduce our dependence on fragile empirical rationales. For instance, even if service-learning enhances students' grades, it may turn out that other interventions do so more efficiently. Should we therefore give up on service-learning? That would be an appropriate conclusion *if* the only purpose of service-learning were to increase human capital. But there are other plausible reasons for it.

PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES

Contemporary moral and political philosophy provides rich and diverse resources for thinking about youth civic development. After several decades of groundbreaking empirical work on civic development—including a paradigm shift to "positive youth development" (Lerner, 2004), it would now be useful to renew the dialogue between psychology and philosophy. One starting point is to ask how each of the main current schools of moral philosophy would assess major forms of civic education. Actual philosophers are often eclectic, drawing from more than one school or tradition. Nevertheless, these main schools provide useful heuristics.

One major stream of modern moral reasoning is consequentialist. It assesses any action or institution by measuring its net outcomes or consequences. The leading subset of consequentialism is utilitarianism, which presumes that the consequences that matter are measures of human *welfare*. Welfare, in turn, can be defined in terms of subjective satisfaction or happiness; objective indicators, such as life expectancy; or the ability to satisfy preferences. Utilitarianism has had an enormous influence on welfare economics and, more generally, the social sciences. It is a demanding ethical doctrine, requiring that we do whatever is possible to maximize aggregate welfare. If taken seriously, it would require deep changes in social policies, including (most probably) massive increases in educational investments.

A utilitarian might favor civic opportunities because they have been found to enhance students' welfare. For instance, an evaluation of the Quantum Opportunities Program (QOP) studied randomly selected students and a

control group. For about $2,500 per year over four years, QOP was able to reduce the likelihood of dropping out to 8%, compared to 44% for the control group. QOP's approach included academic programs that were individually paced for each student; mandatory community service; enrichment programs; and pay for each hour of participation (Hahn, Leavitt, & Aaron, 1994; Eccles & Gootman, 2002). For a utilitarian, the cost of this program would be a disadvantage (because having to pay taxes presumably reduces the welfare of the taxpayers); but the social benefits might outweigh the costs. People who complete high school are generally better off, economically and in other ways, than those who do not. They also contribute more to the economy, thereby enhancing other people's welfare. Indeed, the evaluators estimate the social benefits of QOP at $39,037 per student, and the net benefits (i.e., the benefits minus the costs) at $28,427. "This exercise," they conclude, "shows that QOP will pay large dividends." A utilitarian reading this report would conclude that programs like QOP are moral imperatives, unless some other approach turns out to be even more effective (Hahn, Leavitt, & Aaron, 1994, p. 19).

One standard argument against utilitarianism is that it overlooks fairness among individuals by focusing on aggregate welfare (Rawls, 1971/2005, pp. 19–24). There are situations in which making disadvantaged people even worse off can increase aggregate social welfare; in such cases, simple utilitarianism is blind to fairness. However, utilitarians can provide indirect arguments for focusing resources on the most disadvantaged young people. One argument is that the marginal benefits are likely to be greatest when we offer opportunities to adolescents who would otherwise be "at risk" of failure in school. For instance, the QOP program obtained efficient outcomes because it was directed at disadvantaged middle-school students, many of whom were otherwise likely to become pregnant.

The other utilitarian argument for equity is political. Jeremy Bentham, the first utilitarian, asserted that representative democracy was the form of government that would best promote aggregate welfare. Democratic governments were most likely to address genuine public needs and allocate resources efficiently. Our actual democracy, however, is marked by highly unequal participation and does not respond equally to everyone's needs (American Political Science Association, 2004). In order to achieve more equitable representation, we need to help young people develop the skills, habits, knowledge, and motivations that will increase their participation.

Utilitarianism does not provide direct reasons to protect individual freedom and choice. Utilitarians would support mandatory civic education programs that enhance social welfare even if youth do not wish to enroll. Most Americans have utilitarian intuitions with respect to adolescents: We are willing to override young people's freedom to promote their welfare.

Unlike utilitarianism, Kantianism puts autonomy at the center. Immanuel Kant is perhaps best known as the proponent of the Categorical Imperative, which says that we must be able to generalize the *maxims* of our actions so that they would apply to everyone in similar circumstances. This principle proves vague in application, and many contemporary Kantians believe that the useful heart of his philosophy lies elsewhere. Kant argued that we had two fundamental duties: to develop our own rational autonomy, and to help others develop and pursue reasonable goals of their own choosing (Baron, 1997). The measure of an action was not its consequences, but the quality of the free human will that lay behind it. To be autonomous, goals had to be freely chosen, but they also had to be rational (i.e., examined, coherent, and capable of public justification).

A Kantian would not be concerned about the impact of civic programs on objective measures of welfare, such as graduation rates. However, a Kantian might be impressed by programs or opportunities that seem to enhance the autonomy of their participants. Programs would seem especially promising to Kantians if they encouraged young people to reflect upon moral issues and choices, form and defend their own opinions, and act accordingly (see Beaumont, this volume). The Just Community (JC) approach to civic and moral education is a good example (Power & Higgins-D'Alessandro, 2008; Higgins-D'Alessandro & Power, 2005; Power, Higgins, & Kohlberg, 1989). Students and teachers create a school community together using principles of fairness and democratic processes (e.g., one person, one vote; open discussion and debate) to govern themselves. Self-governance develops students' (and teachers') autonomy, critical moral reasoning, and leadership as well as a sense of group membership, affectionate ties, and responsibility. The school's aspirational norms and values become embodied in rules and sanctions and the intrinsic valuing of community. In the JC schools, students' moral reasoning is significantly higher after two to three years relative to that of comparison students. Kantians might also value outcomes such as success in school, but only as *indirect* evidence that students were developing autonomy. To continue with the same example, the Just Community's focus on self-governance at the community level leads to self-governance or autonomy on the individual level, which translates into better school attendance, class participation, and academic performance (Power et al., 1989; Higgins-D'Alessandro, 2008). The effects on academic performance would strike a utilitarian as strong arguments for JC; for Kantians, they matter only insofar as success in school implies greater autonomy for students.

Both Kantians and utilitarians have reasons to favor programs such as QOP and the Just Community (assuming that the evaluations cited above are accurate). However, their reasons are quite different, and this difference matters when we confront questions such as whether to mandate service-

learning, whether youth should always co-lead their own service projects with teachers, or whether to count economic welfare as a positive outcome of service. These issues are complex, and Kantians need not always take different sides from utilitarians. For instance, although utilitarians are not directly concerned about freedom, they might be dissuaded from imposing service requirements if such obligations usually breed resentment. Kantians care a great deal about freedom, but they might support a service *mandate* if service reliably expands young people's sense of options and possibilities and therefore enhances their autonomy later on. They would be more likely to support a mandate if students recognize and agree with the proposition that mandatory service not only helps others, it also enhances their own future autonomy. This has happened in one JC school, where students have voted to impose service mandates on themselves but have also voted to remove the same mandates when they seemed to lose their meaning. Such cycles reveal the need for human beings—in this case, students—to make meaning of their experiences as discussed under civic republicanism in this chapter. A substantial majority of alumni from the last two decades of this JC school reported that they are currently civically or politically active in their communities whether they participated in mandatory *or* volunteer service as students (Vozzola, Rosen, Higgins-D'Alessandro, & Horan, 2009). Overall, Kantians and utilitarians will seek different evidence and may reach different conclusions in concrete cases. They will also justify the very same program in different ways; and justifications matter in the public debate.

A third relevant stream of modern philosophy is civic republicanism. Its core idea is that civic participation (deliberating, collaborating, volunteering, advocating, and voting) is not a cost. It is not work that we must unfortunately do in order to sustain a just society. Rather, it is a good and an intrinsically dignified and rewarding form of human behavior. Some civic republicans rank various human pursuits and place political activism high on their lists. Aristotle, for example, considered politics the second-highest way of life after philosophy itself (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1177b). Others are pluralists. They do not believe that there is one universal and objective ranking of human goods, but they consider civic participation to be a good rather than a cost (Galston, 2002).

Civic republicans should view civic opportunities for young people as intrinsically valuable, regardless of their outcomes. For example, a one-time service project is unlikely to boost any long-term outcomes; thus it has weak appeal for utilitarians. But civic republicans could argue that schools and colleges are communities. Good communities offer opportunities for collaboration and service. Therefore, even one-time service projects are valuable.

Civic republicans could argue, further, that young people should be exposed to the satisfactions of participation so that they may choose to be

engaged when they are adults. We are barraged by advertising for other goods, such as consumer products. Civic participation is not widely promoted. Civic republicans might see effective forms of civic education as advertisements for participation.

A related argument in favor of civic participation begins with the observation that human beings *make meaning*. That is, they create narratives, images, performances, rituals, and melodies that integrate simple facts or impressions into more ambitious, more significant wholes. Meaning-making can be seen as a source of happiness and satisfaction, as an expression of rational autonomy, or as intrinsically valuable. In other words, it can be linked to utilitarianism, Kantianism, or civic republicanism, albeit in different ways.

In any event, civic engagement is essential for meaning-making. By interacting in groups and trying to persuade peers, we create narratives about ourselves and our communities and develop opinions. Hannah Arendt used *acting* as a specialized term for persuasion and collaboration (in contrast to *work*, which for her meant individual creativity, and *labor*, which meant subsistence). She wrote, "In acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human world" (Arendt, 1958, p. 179). Civic participation rewarded eloquence, and eloquence was a way to make meaning.

People who participate in groups also generate *collective* narratives and build institutions whose buildings, logos, mission statements, and rituals reflect common meanings. This kind of work is a powerful antidote to mass culture. As de Tocqueville observed, members of large democratic societies tend to prefer cultural goods that are popular. Books are advertised as "best sellers," movies as "blockbusters," and songs as "hits" because democratic audiences trust popularity as evidence of quality. In aristocratic cultures, on the other hand, elites have disproportionate consumer power and tend to view popularity as a mark of vulgarity (de Tocqueville, 1954, II, 3, xvii). Therefore, we should expect that mass-produced culture will prevail in a democracy, and then most people will be less able to create meaning. All our narratives, images, and melodies will come out of Hollywood (or its equivalent). However, when people participate actively in communities and associations, they have opportunities to create distinctive cultural goods, and they have audiences for their products. They also have incentives to influence the content of cultural products; and if they lose debates about what meanings to make, they can exit and create new associations. Thus, in a strong civil society, cultural products become diverse; and that diversity is an argument for civic engagement.

Philosophical schools such as utilitarianism, Kantianism, and civic republicanism consistently apply a few abstract principles to all relevant cases. That methodology has itself been criticized, most notably by communitarians.

Drawing on Hume, Hegel, and other classic sources, they argue that our duties are not abstract and general, but derive from our particular and contingent connections to fellow members of our own communities and families, with whom we happen to have common histories. Denying these bonds in the name of autonomy or universality, according to communitarians, leaves us bereft of the basic materials of a good life (Sandel, 1984; Taylor, 1984). Certain kinds of civic opportunities, especially voluntary service, seem to embody communitarian values. Some forms of feminism and critical race theory are communitarian in their emphasis on respecting identity differences. There are Kantian and utilitarian reasons for paying attention to racial and gender equity, but not for valuing ethnic or gender solidarity as intrinsic goods.

Another critic of abstract philosophical principles was John Dewey, a major influence on pragmatist theorists of education ever since. Dewey asserted that no general principles (no "antecedent universal propositions") could distinguish just institutions from unjust ones. The nature of a good society was "something to be critically and experimentally determined" (Dewey, 1927, p. 74). Any effort to identify and apply independent criteria would be naïve, because philosophy is always "intrinsically" connected to "social history" (Dewey, 1931, p. 3). Dewey's skepticism or relativism would seem to invalidate any normative distinctions, but he tried to construct a positive ideal out of a few modest commitments. One commitment was *learning*: A good society continuously revisited and changed its normative commitments. The second was *experience*: The only way to learn was to try things in the real world. And the third was *deliberation*: Learning worked best when people of different backgrounds discussed, planned, and experienced together. Therefore, in Dewey's view, such democratic institutions as "popular voting, majority rule and so on" were valuable *only* because "to some extent they involve a consultation and discussion which uncover social needs and troubles" (Dewey, 1927, p. 206). All groups (even criminal bands) promote some internal discussion, but some groups were better than others. The criterion for assessing a group was not whether it endorsed the right principles (no such things could be identified), but rather whether its membership were diverse and open. The two questions to use in evaluating a group were: "How numerous and varied are the interests which are consciously shared?" and "How full and free is the interplay with other forms of association?" (Dewey, 1916, p. 89).

These criteria can be applied to schools as communities. Deweyan pragmatists understand them as institutions within which people (including youth) make—rather than discover—moral values. We can assess schools morally not by asking whether they have reached the right conclusions about matters like rights and duties, but whether their discussions were diverse, open, and

experiential. The Deweyan justification for activities like service-learning is straightforward, as long as the "learning" aspect is strong and participants are diverse. The Just Community is an example of a self-consciously created open, diverse, democratic learning community grounded in this Deweyan ideal. The JC theory of education as development mixes the Kantian emphasis on autonomy and critical moral reasoning with the actual practice of building a self-governing community. As mentioned earlier, many actual philosophers draw on more than one tradition in developing their views. An important and relevant example is the "capabilities approach" as defended by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum (Alkire, 2002, pp. 32–43; Crocker, 1995). Sen and Nussbaum share the Kantian intuition that autonomy is an essential human value. They criticize objective measures of social welfare, because free human beings may reasonably choose *not* to pursue these outcomes. For example, some communities are committed to religion rather than affluence. The fact that monks do not eat well does not mean that they lack welfare (Sen, 1985). Likewise, an individual may choose hardships in order to be closer to nature.

On the other hand, Sen and Nussbaum reject the idea that autonomy is simply a matter of free choice. First of all, some actual choices harm the true interests of the individual: Using addictive narcotics would be an example. Other choices reflect a narrow sense of what is possible, constrained by cultural biases. Moreover, people need goods before they can be truly autonomous: for instance, education, legal rights, and a sense of self-respect. Therefore, Sen and Nussbaum recommend *capabilities* as the criteria of social justice. In a good society, everyone has certain core capabilities, such as working, playing, raising children, participating in politics, and appreciating nature and art. These capabilities can be expressed in various ways or even forgone, depending on the free choices of individuals. For example, if I have the ability to raise children but choose not to act on it, there is no injustice. In Sen's terminology, I may have the "capability" but not the "functioning" of parenthood. Justice is measured by the objective amount and distribution of capabilities, not functionings.

The capabilities approach would support certain forms of youth civic engagement, for several reasons. The youth themselves would develop one particular capability, namely, political participation. Some of their other capabilities might be strengthened as well; for example, service appears to boost educational success. Finally, Sen and Nussbaum believe that communities must decide democratically how to develop and promote the capabilities of their own members. Civic and democratic education (which may or may not include service) seems relevant here as a means to develop the capability of political participation. Sen and Nussbaum offer lists of human capabilities that are intended to be objective and universal, but many subsidiary choices

remain to be made democratically (see Haste, this volume). By developing young people's skills of social analysis and deliberation, we help to promote democratic decision making and thereby optimize society's support for capabilities.

We have not been able to find any scholarly work that connects the capabilities approach (which is influential in development economics and political philosophy) with the theory of "positive youth development" (which arose in developmental psychology and influences youth programming). Positive youth development asserts that young people should be treated as assets to their communities who can contribute distinctively because of their energy, creativity, independence, and fresh thinking. They will "thrive" better, on this view, if they are encouraged to contribute than if they are treated as vulnerable to pathologies and failures, such as crime, suicide, academic failure, or sexually transmitted diseases (Lerner, 2004, pp. 85–107; cf. Nussbaum & Sen, 1993, p. 1). Positive youth development is a critique of the prevailing deficit model, which encourages strategies of monitoring, prevention, remediation, and discipline that, in the aggregate, send an alienating and disempowering message to adolescents. Young people respond better when given opportunities to be actively engaged and to serve. Especially in the work of Richard M. Lerner, a positive relationship between adolescents and their communities is understood as bi-directional; when things go well, youth benefit from serving their communities, and communities improve because of youth service and voice.

This is an empirical thesis for which there is considerable support (Eccles & Gootman, 2002). But one might ask why we *hope* that the evidence supports the theory of positive youth development. Wouldn't it be easier if one could solve adolescent pathologies with efficient programs of monitoring and prevention? The underlying normative reason, we believe, is best articulated in the capabilities approach, which suggests that the first duty of a just regime is not to maximize welfare but to enhance individuals' capacities to play *their choice* of positive roles. We should not specify our goals for adolescents in terms of reducing the high-school dropout rate or cutting teen pregnancy. These are measures of welfare, not of capabilities. A highly capable young person will probably finish high school and avoid early pregnancy *in order* to enhance her ability to pursue challenging ends of her own choice. Thus the measure of our success is her capability, not her success in school or her age when becoming a parent.

This brief sketch of philosophical views toward youth civic engagement has omitted other questions that are equally relevant. For instance: Who deserves citizenship (i.e, full membership in a community)? What rights and obligations should come with citizenship? What civic or political roles should be played by, for instance, elected representatives, voluntary

associations, and the clergy? Which public problems should be addressed by the people acting through the state, and which should be addressed in civil society?

Plainly, these are enormous questions, basic to political theory. Even a short list underlines how deeply our views of "civic engagement" depend upon our ideas of justice, fairness, the good life, and the good society.

WHAT NORMATIVE POSITIONS ARE EMBODIED IN ACTUAL PROGRAMS?

Dozens of trademarked programs attempt to teach various aspects of civic engagement to American youth. They range from the federally funded Center for Civic Education and its *We the People . . . The Citizen and the Constitution* curriculum (with a heavy emphasis on constitutional law) to grassroots voluntary associations like *Sistas on the Rise* in the Bronx, NY, which helps "young mothers and women of color raise consciousness, build sisterhood and take action for social change." In addition, many thousands of schoolteachers and staff of youth programs develop and teach their own curricula or combinations of curricula. Each of these interventions has goals and intentions, which, in the case of the trademarked programs, can usually be read in mission statements and on web sites. But interventions may also have undisclosed or inadvertent messages and effects. To make matters even more complicated, the messages and the effects may not coincide, for students may take away unintended lessons. Thus, it is a complex matter to determine what normative positions are embodied in real-life classes and programs.

In order to provide some brief illustrations, we have consulted professional program evaluations of several prominent trademarked programs. In each case, students were assessed using measures that had good psychometric properties and that seemed to fit the intentions of the program's designers, who were involved in various ways in these studies. In each case, the evaluation found positive impacts on the measures tested (notwithstanding some variation in methodology and rigor among the studies). Thus we can say that these programs attempted to—and actually did—enhance the specified outcomes for their enrolled students. Our question is what normative orientation would lead someone to *want* to have these effects.

1. *Facing History and Ourselves* is a nonprofit organization that provides curricula, professional development, and materials related to historical examples of severe intergroup conflict, such as the Holocaust. Students are encouraged to discuss and critically evaluate their own identities and responsibilities. (See Selman & Kwok, this volume, on the program.) In an evaluation by Schultz, Barr, and Selman (2001), participating students and

a comparison group were given questionnaires with scales designed to measure numerous aspects of "interpersonal development," understood as "interpersonal understanding" (knowledge of how groups interrelate), interpersonal skills (strategies that support good relationships), and personal meaning (the ability to reflect on "one's actions and emotional investment in a particular relationship"). For instance, students were given the Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure instrument developed by Jean Phinney, which includes items such as: "I have a strong sense of belonging to my own ethnic group" (Phinney, 1992). They were also asked about their own "modern racism," as measured by their response to prompts such as: "Over the last few years, racial and ethnic minorities have gained more economically than they deserve" (Schultz et al., 2001, p. 12). And they were given self-reported measures of behavior, such as involvement with social issues and fighting, among others.

The results indicate that students in *Facing History and Ourselves* "showed increased relationship maturity and decreased fighting behavior, racist attitudes, and insular ethnic identity relative to comparison students" (Schultz et al., p. 23). These outcomes are treated as positive, as evidence of the program's *efficacy*. That is not a particularly controversial judgment, although the evaluators' interpretation of "opposition to affirmative action" as evidence of "subtle prejudice" *would be* controversial (Schultz et al., p. 12). There could also be controversy about whether the goals of the program (such as *relationship maturity*) justify allocations of students' time; whether and where the program fits into the broader curriculum; and whether the U.S. government has a right to promote some of these attitudes, such as a lessening of *insular ethnic identity*. A certain image of the good citizen emerges from the evaluation: He or she will be conscious of ethnic identities and capable of working peacefully and respectfully across lines of difference.

Dennis Barr, evaluation director of *Facing History and Ourselves*, writes that the program "integrates the study of history and ethics in order to promote young people's capacity and commitment to be thoughtful and active participants in society who are able to balance self-interest with a genuine concern for the perspectives, rights and welfare of others" (Barr, 2005, p. 156). There is a strong element of Kantian ethics in this summary statement. Being thoughtful and self-critical, seeing matters from others' perspectives, and being concerned about rights are core Kantian values. The themes of positive youth development and building student capacities in *Facing History* align with Sen and Nussbaum's ideas that a just society builds human capabilities.

Facing History is also concerned with ethnic group membership as a form of identity. That goal is in some tension with utilitarianism and Kantianism,

both of which classically understand human beings as part of a single, undifferentiated human community. For Lawrence Kohlberg, the highest stage of moral development is a "universal-ethical-principle orientation." This stage (as Kohlberg wrote) has "a distinctively Kantian ring" (1973, p. 632).

In Kant's original terms, the fully developed moral agent is a citizen of one universal and undifferentiated *Kingdom of Ends.* John Rawls (1971/2005, p. 136) operationalized this idea by proposing that we try to reason about justice behind a "veil of ignorance," in which we do not know our own identities. Likewise, in classical utilitiarianism, each human being is to count for one and none for more than one. With its respect for, and interest in, ethnic particularism, *Facing History and Ourselves* seems to depart from classical Kantian and utilitarian thinking. But bridges can be built. For example, a core Kantian principle is respect for others; if ethnic identity is constitutive of selves, then one must understand and appreciate ethnicities to be respectful of others. Likewise, if people's happiness or welfare depends on having healthy attitudes toward their own ethnic groups, then understanding and even celebrating ethnic identity is important from a utilitarian perspective.

Indeed, in Kolhberg's work, the highest stage of moral reasoning, *Stage 6,* gradually developed into a *balance* between abstract and impersonal justice and personalized care or sympathy. Kohlberg, Boyd, and Levine (1986) stated the idea this way:

> ...although these two attitudes (benevolence and justice) are in tension with each other, they are at the same time mutually supportive and coordinated with a Stage 6 conception of respect for persons. This coordination can be summarized thus: benevolence constrains the momentary concern for justice to remain consistent with the promotion of good for all, while justice constrains benevolence not to be inconsistent with promoting respect for the rights of individuals conceived as autonomous agents. (p. 6)

Moreover, Kohlberg argued that the motivator for moral decision making is the feeling of sympathy for others; without that, we would not put ourselves in their place or adopt the view of the impartial spectator to try to reach a fair solution; we would just take what we could get. He said that starting moral decision making with an act of empathy (taking the original position or playing moral musical chairs, as Kohlberg characterized it) leads to a more just decision, one that is more clearly reversible. Sympathy of this sort becomes refined throughout development and transformed at Stage 6 into the moral point of view. Kohlberg's late statements about Stage 6 seem quite consistent with *Facing History's* approach.

2. *We the People...* is a curriculum with supporting materials and professional development opportunities funded by the U.S. Department of Education through the Center for Civic Education. Its relatively substantial and

stable funding has allowed it to reach more than 26 million students (Hartry & Porter, 2004). Evaluations to date have used less rigorous designs than the evaluations we summarize here for other programs, but it is important to review the outcomes included in the *We the People* evaluations because they reflect an effort to articulate purposes for a publicly funded and authorized program.

In a 1991 evaluation by the Educational Testing Service, participating students and comparison groups were given items from the National Assessment of Education Progress Civics Assessment. Students were asked questions such as: "Prayer periods in public schools are allowed by the Supreme Court..." (Correct answer: "in no instances.") Participants scored higher than comparison students, leading the evaluators to conclude, "The We the People... program had a strong positive impact on high school students' knowledge of the history and principles of the U.S. Constitution" (Educational Testing Service, 1991, p. 2). Again, a concept of good citizenship emerges: Americans are supposed to understand core principles embodied in the U.S. Constitution and other classic texts.

The evaluation by the Educational Testing Service does not explain why public funds should be used to enhance such understanding. However, in a later evaluation by Hartry and Porter (2004), the central goal of *We the People*... is described as "promoting civic competence and responsibility." This goal is operationalized as a long list of outcomes that include positive attitudes toward American political institutions, knowledge of these institutions, and political participation (e.g., working for a political party or candidate; participating in a peaceful protest).

A 2007 evaluation by RMC Research investigated the *Project Citizen* middle-school program from the Center for Civic Education, which involves student research and advocacy on local policy issues. Students were observed to gain "civic knowledge, civic discourse skills, and public problem solving skills." Changes were greater than in comparison classrooms. A methodological limitation, however, is that "Potential classrooms for the study were identified by state or national coordinators of Project Citizen." Teachers in the Project Citizen classrooms suggested the comparison classrooms. This method raises serious questions about generalizing the findings to the program as a whole (Root & Northup, 2007, pp. 5, 35).

Although these evaluations do not advance elaborate normative justifications, it is implicit that the Center for Civic Education values high rates of informed and enthusiastic political participation within the mainstream American political system because that system is beneficial (for utilitarian, Kantian, and/or civic republican reasons). In addition, since it is used in civic education courses required for high school graduation by every state in the United States, it seems the Center for Civic Education relies on the

normative justifications of such laws. Civic education is deemed necessary for the continuance of the U.S. system of government.

A different criterion for evaluation would involve the *distribution* of benefits from *We the People* to different groups of students. *We the People* participants are involved in team competitions at the local and national level. There is a risk that academically stronger students would progress further in these competitions and thereby benefit more. Root and Northrup (2007) address this question, finding that gains in participating students' skills were the same regardless of gender or home language. On some measures, non-White students made more progress than White students. However, family socioeconomic status was not controlled in this evaluation, and the population studied was 84% White in grades 6 to 8 and 88% White in grades 9 to 12. This suggests that *Project Citizen* may serve disproportionately advantaged students, which would be problematic from an egalitarian or utilitarian perspective.

3. *KidsVoting USA* is a third nonprofit organization that provides curricula, materials, and professional development. The students' culminating experience is a mock election modeled on the official election in the district where they are enrolled, but there are also intensive discussions and class projects related to government and current issues. In an evaluation by Patrick C. Meirick and Daniel B. Wackman, the program was found to raise students' knowledge of politics (measured by current factual questions, such as "Who is the governor of Texas?"); to reduce gaps in knowledge between the most and least knowledgeable students; and to increase the consistency between students' opinions on issues and their own voting behavior. (Meirick & Wackman, 2004). Other evaluations by Michael McDevitt and colleagues reinforce these conclusions (McDevitt, 2003; McDevitt & Kiousis, 2004; McDevitt & Kiousis, 2006). Evaluations of the value of procedural learning (participating in mock elections) on future voting have not been done to our knowledge, but if they showed effectiveness (increased voting), it would suggest a utilitarian justification.

Here, the normative frame is egalitarian. The evaluators cite evidence that knowledge of current political events is a precursor to voting (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). Voting is a source of power but unequally distributed. *KidsVoting USA* "works" to the extent that it decreases political inequality by increasing usable political knowledge and reducing gaps. Perhaps the most intriguing result is that *parents* were more likely to discuss politics and current events if their children were enrolled in *KidsVoting*—a "trickle-up effect" (McDevitt, Kiousis, Wu, Losch, and Ripley, 2004). The underlying reason for that goal might be utilitarian, since a polity that responds equally to all members should maximize aggregate welfare. As in *We the People*, many of the outcomes are measures of factual knowledge; but *KidsVoting*

USA emphasizes information that is immediately relevant to political action. (For instance, you need to know the identity of the governor of your state in order to vote in a gubernatorial election that features the incumbent.)

Note that these three widely used programs chose sets of evaluation measures that hardly overlapped at all, probably because they chose measures based on each particular program's content. All were successful on their own terms, but each cultivated different kinds of civic engagement. The range would be much greater if we also discussed religious, political, and union-sponsored programs.

4. *The Just Community* is a fourth approach that has taken a more explicit philosophical stance. In contrast to the others discussed here, it is not a product, but rather an approach to education. Kohlberg saw development as the goal of education (Kohlberg & Mayer, 1981) distinguishing between his psychological theory of moral reasoning development and an educational theory that supports children's development. Thus, developmental theories can inform educational theories regarding the developmental capacities and needs of students of different ages but cannot be substituted for them (Kohlberg & Higgins, 1987). The educational theory, the Just Community approach, developed over time from 1974 with an increasing understanding of the developmental processes through which JC schools enhance both individual and group moral decision making, autonomy, valuing of community, and teachers' and students' investment in learning. As noted above, the JC approach is consonant with Dewey's (1916) progressive educational ideas that schools should be communities that sufficiently mirror the larger democratic society if they are to promote effective learning and future citizenship. As the name implies, both justice and community constitute goals and means of the approach. Justice is embodied in the following democratic institutions: one large weekly community meeting, smaller class-size advisory groups to prepare for the community meeting and discuss current issues, and fairness and agenda committees. Justice is a means because these institutions focus on issues of fairness, rights, duties, and equity.

The JC school is democratically governed, one person one vote. Community meetings establish norms and values through open discussion of the importance of rules and rights as well as rule making and enforcement. Community building is, in part, what educators now describe as creating a positive school climate. However, it is more. By taking ownership for the governance of their own group and making decisions about what kind of community they want to form, students and teachers build a community they intrinsically value as well as one that is personally meaningful and instrumentally helpful. Thus, justice and community are the main moral content of JC schools.

In democratic, self-governed programs, concrete understanding the expe-
riences of other members from their viewpoint, rather than from one's own,
can lead to decisions to change the community itself. For example, for one
JC school, ethnic identity became an explicit issue when Blacks argued that
their numerical minority status interfered with their feeling the same strong
sense of ownership of the community as did White students. For the next two
years, this JC school admitted mostly Black students (reverse discrimination)
until all members felt they truly "owned" the school. Different educational
means that are used to give students prolonged and varied experiences of
deeply sympathetic perspective-taking can modify or, as one of us would
say, actualize universalism.

Although in a JC school, teachers and students are formally equal in
many respects, teachers continue to have more inherent authority as adults
and are recognized as curricular and pedagogical experts. Just Commu-
nity teachers learn to be advocates for the good of the community, and not
only for their own positions. Teacher advocacy does not constitute moral
constraint because its effects are open to democratic discussion and deci-
sions (and has been challenged and addressed in some JC schools as *teacher
intimidation*).

The Just Community approach is informed by Durkheim (1973) almost
as much as it is by the constructivist theories of Piaget (1932) and Kohlberg
(Kohlberg & Mayer, 1981), with their focus creating educational conditions
to foster development, that is, active and challenging interactions and deci-
sion making among peers. Durkheim's socialization theory of moral for-
mation argues that respect for rules arises from a group's authority and
thus, that fostering attachment to the group and group solidarity is vital
to understanding one's moral duty. A tension with Durkheimian thought
is whether the content of moral norms is relative to each group or society.
The Just Community approach adapts Durkheim by infusing a Kantian
attitude and resting the idea of moral duty not on the group's authority
but on the authority of individuals as autonomous and members of a com-
munity. The group's power comes from self-conscious sharing of the norms
to which all have agreed, norms of respect for each other, for dialogue,
and for the community itself. Like Kant, the Just Community does not
equate a majority vote with what is morally right; it developed practices
to ensure minority voice as in the aforementioned example in which White
students listened and acted on the concerns of their Black peers to feel
fully enfranchised. Just as Durkheim believed that altruistic morality arose
from feelings of attachment and solidarity with the group, the JC approach
strives to build communities of trust in which students and teachers alike
consciously and spontaneously look after each other's interests. Lastly,
following Durkheim's lead, the purpose of discipline is to reintegrate a

violator back into the community, not just to sanction him. At the heart of this intervention is civic republicanism, or learning to appreciate the obligations of a democratic society for their own sake and weaving together individual and group narratives that form the basis of symbolic interactionists theory of the moral self (Higgins-D'Alessandro & Power, 2005; Kohlberg & Higgins, 1987).

In summary, the Just Community approach is one of the few prosocial education interventions to elaborate its philosophical and psychological assumptions and how they inform practice. JC schools aim to foster moral awareness and development as well as ethical engagement with others, with a community, and with broader political and civic issues. The JC pursues these goals by transforming the nature of schooling, by turning a school into a valued community that promotes voice, growing autonomy, and shared experiences of students and teachers as they form a community together using the ideas of justice, rights, duties, and equity.

Research on the secondary-level JC schools shows that students' social and moral thinking develops, and that students working side-by-side with teachers are able to create and sustain self-governing communities with increasingly positive and effective moral cultures. An analysis of community meeting discussions over four years showed more fair, inclusive, and equitable norms developed, sanctions became more constructive, the need for discipline dropped off dramatically, and attachment to school and valuing community increased (Higgins, Power, & Kohlberg, 1989; Higgins-D'Alessandro & Power, 2005; Oser, Althof, & Higgins-D'Alessandro, 2008). In addition, a study of alumni showed that high percentages of respondents continue to be actively engaged in community service and credit not only the service learning program and outreach activities but also the sense of self and community they gained while in a Just Community school (Vozzola, Rosen, Higgins-D'Alessandro, & Horan, 2009). It should also be mentioned that JC teachers' social and moral reasoning develops over time due to the richness of the teaching environment, with almost all reasoning post-conventionally (i.e., reasoning from a prior-to-society perspective that what is right is determined by moral considerations first and by legal and conventional considerations second, Stage 5, after about five or more years). They also report teaching in a democratic community transforms them professionally and personally (Higgins-D'Alessandro, 2002). The major studies of this approach were done within an action research paradigm, meaning that the researchers in the first JC schools were also the interventionists. This may be seen as a limitation because researchers who conduct action research, similar to those involved in participatory evaluations, realize they have taken a value position that they will better understand a program from straddling the line between inside and outside. This means they must

carefully monitor their assumptions and inclinations and create method-
ological procedures that optimize transparency so that others may judge
their work.

IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH AND PRACTICE

Good social scientists know that values are important as both explanations
and outcomes of human behavior and that values differ between people,
communities, and programs. Some social scientists study values (their
development, their correlates, and their prevalence in different cultures and
times); and some social scientists are capable of seeing the world from dif-
ferent value perspectives than their own (Flanagan, 2003).

Good evaluators know that programs embody values and that different
programs embody different values. They are skillful at elucidating the values
that each program represents.

That someone holds a particular value is an empirical claim. It is either
true or false (or maybe a mix of the two). A normative claim is different. It is
a claim that particular values are good or right, or bad or wrong. That kind
of claim is rarely published in social science journals and academic program
evaluations (although it is the mainstay of academic philosophy and polit-
ical theory). A social scientist might say that working class urban youth hold
a particular value, and that this value is important to them and important
for the effectiveness of any programs that engage them. The researcher may
quote the youth and even design an evaluation in collaboration with them.
But if the researcher asserts that their value is right or wrong, that claim is
no longer seen as *science*. In a scientific publication, the author is supposed to
reduce the significance of his or her value judgments, which are understood
as opinions or even biases, not as facts. And yet nothing is more important
than having good values and explaining why they are good.

We still live in a positivist age. Positivism implies a strict distinc-
tion between facts (seen as observable and testable) and values (seen as
important and interesting, perhaps, but also as arbitrary and subjective).
Our controversial claim is that the designers of programs, evaluators, and
researchers should adopt values of their own, put them on the table, and
defend them, because the debate about values—not who holds which values,
but which ones are good—is the most important discussion. The alternative
is to submerge the discussion about values into an empirical literature that
is actually rife with value judgments. Science should be a public enterprise
rather than one that hides behind a cloak of objectivity, which in the end is
impossible.

In the studies cited above (as in almost all published evaluations in
the field of youth civic engagement), substantial attention is given to the

psychometric properties of survey questions and scales.[2] Items should work the same when reused later; different scorers should obtain the same results when they use the same instruments on the same populations; subjects should understand the questions as they were intended; and items that are supposed to measure the same factors should correlate. These are empirical matters that do not directly raise value questions. But the measures that show these good psychometric properties did not come from nowhere. Someone decided to ask about the Constitution rather than the *Communist Manifesto* and the governor of Texas rather than the Dallas Cowboys' starting quarterback. Scales of questions about Marxism or American football could have high Cronbach alphas (strong internal reliability), but that would not make them good evaluation measures for civics. Many survey and test questions involve subtle judgments about institutions. For example, it is common to ask whether respondents regularly read a newspaper. To treat that as a positive outcome presumes an overall favorable judgment about newspapers today (which is, however, compatible with various criticisms of newspapers). Asking about newspaper use also presumes that it is beneficial for *many* citizens to engage directly with the press. These are controversial assumptions. Their merit will change as institutions change; newspapers are quite different from their predecessors in 1950 or 1850.

Often evaluations cite literature in which the same measures have been used before. But previous use of an item in an empirical study does not prove that it measures valuable outcomes (or even that it measures what it purports to measure). Whether our measures are good depends essentially on whether our values are right. To be guided by values is not a limitation or a bias. If our values are good, following them is a virtue. Unfortunately, our values differ. In our view, it is most important to specify one's normative positions in detail and to defend them with ethical reasons. It is essential to use valid and reliable measures and to find genuine empirical links between interventions and outcomes; that is the role of science. But an exclusive reliance on scientific-sounding criteria can avoid ethical accountability if one fails to disclose *and defend* the real reasons for one's goals.

Disclosure is relatively straightforward; one notes the fact that one holds certain values. Defending such values is harder, especially if one does not resort automatically to utilitarianism. Moral argumentation requires a shift out of a positivist framework, as one gives non-empirical *reasons* for one's positions. Philosophy and normative social theory provide rich resources for such arguments. With a few exceptions, such as Facing History and Just

---

2 Of the studies cited here, only the evaluations of *We the People* ... lack elaborate discussions of psychometrics, but they borrow items from the National Assessment of Education Progress, which is carefully tested and constructed.

Communities, we do not see much explicit moral argumentation in either the justifications or the evaluations of civic programs. Influential and relevant schools of philosophy, such as the Capabilities Approach of Sen and Nussbaum, are entirely missing in the empirical literature on youth civic engagement. In turn, recent academic philosophy has not benefited enough from reflecting on innovative youth programs, a method that Plato, Erasmus, Rousseau, Dewey, and others found generative in earlier times.

REFERENCES

Alkire, S. (2002). *Valuing freedoms: Sen's capability approach and poverty reduction*. Oxford University Press.

American Political Science Association, Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy. (2004). *American democracy in an age of rising inequality*. Washington, DC: American Political Science Association.

Arendt, H. (1958). *The human condition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Baron, M. (1997). Kantian ethics. In M. Baron, P. Pettit, & M. Slote (Eds.), *Three methods of ethics* (pp. 3–91). Oxford: Blackwell.

Barr, D. J. (2005). Early adolescents' reflections on social justice: Facing history and ourselves in practice and assessment. *Intercultural Education, 16(2),* 145–60.

Crocker, D. A. (1995). Functioning and capability: The foundations of Sen's and Nussbaum's development ethic. In M. Nussbaum & J. Glover (Eds.), *Women, culture and development: A study in human capabilities* (pp. 153–198). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dávila, A., & Mora, M. T. (2007). *Civic engagement and high school academic progress: An analysis using NELS data* (CIRCLE Working Paper 52). Medford, MA: CIRCLE. Retrieved from http://www.civicyouth.org

Delli Carpini, M. X., & Keeter, S. (1996). *What Americans know about politics and why it matters*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

De Tocqueville, A. (1954). *Democracy in America* (H. Reeve & P. Bradley, Trans.). New York: Vintage Books.

Dewey, J. (1916). *Democracy and education*. New York: Macmillan.

Dewey, J. (1927). *The public and its problems*. New York: Henry Holt.

Dewey, J. (1931). *Philosophy and civilization*. New York: Minton, Balch, & Co.

Durkheim, E. (1973). *Moral education*. New York: Free Press.

Eccles, J., & Gootman, J. A. (Eds.) (2002). *Community programs to promote youth development*. A report of the National Research Council and Institute of Medicine, Board on Children, Youth, and Families, Committee on Community-Level Programs for Youth. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.

Educational Testing Service. (1991). *A comparison of the impact of the We the People . . . curricular materials on high school students compared to university students*. Pasadena, CA: Educational Testing Service.

Flanagan, C. (2003). Developmental roots of political engagement. *PS: Political Science and Politics, 36(2),* 257–261.

Galston, W. A. (2002). *Liberal pluralism: The implications of value pluralism for political theory and practice.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hahn, A., Leavitt, T., and Aaron, P. (1994). *Evaluation of the Quantum Opportunities Program (QOP).* Boston: Brandeis University Press.

Hartry, A., & Porter, K. (2004). *We the People curriculum: Results of a pilot test.* MPR Associates, Inc.

Higgins-D'Alessandro, A. (2008). The judgment-action gap: A modest proposal. In F. K. Oser & W. Veulegers (Eds.), *Getting involved: Global citizenship development and sources of moral values.* Book 1 in moral development and citizenship education series. Rotterdam, The Netherlands: Sense Publishers.

Higgins-D'Alessandro, A. (2002). The necessity of teacher development. In A. Higgins-D'Alessandro & K. Jankowski (Eds.), *Science for society: Informing policy and practice through research in developmental psychology.* New directions for child and adolescent development series. Chicago, IL: Jossey-Bass.

Higgins-D'Alessandro, A., & Power, F. C. (2005). Character, responsibility, and the moral self. In D. Lapsley & F. C. Power (Eds.), *Character psychology and character education* (pp. 101–120). Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

Kohlberg, L. (1973). Justice as reversibility: The claim to moral adequacy of a highest stage of moral judgment. *The Journal of Philosophy, 70(18),* 630–46.

Kohlberg, L., & Higgins, A. (1987). School democracy and social interaction. In J. Gewirtz & W. Kurtines (Eds.), *Social development and social interaction.* New York: Wiley Interscience.

Kohlberg, L., & Mayer, R. (1981). Development as the aim of education. In L. Kohlberg (Ed.), *The Philosophy of Moral Judgment.* San Francisco: Harper & Row.

Kohlberg, L., Boyd, D., & Levine, C. (1986). The return of stage 6: Its principle and moral point of view. In W. Edelstein & G. Nunner-Winkler (Eds.), *Zur bestimmung der moral philosophische und socialwissenschaftliche beitrage zur moralforschung* (1985, October). Paper presented at the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) Ringberg Conference, Tegernsee, Germany.

Lerner, R. M. (2004). *Liberty: Thriving and civic engagement among America's youth.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

McDevitt, M. (2003). *The civic bonding of school and family: How KidsVoting students enliven the domestic sphere* (CIRCLE Working Paper 07). Medford, MA: CIRCLE. Retrieved from http://www.civicyouth.org

McDevitt, M., & Kiousis, S. (2004). *Education for deliberative democracy: The long-term influence of KidsVoting USA* (CIRCLE Working Paper 22). Medford, MA: CIRCLE. Retrieved from http://www.civicyouth.org

McDevitt, M., & Kiousis, S. (2006). *Experiments in political socialization: KidsVoting USA as a model for civic education reform* (CIRCLE Working Paper 49). Medford, MA: CIRCLE. Retrieved from http://www.civicyouth.org

McDevitt, M., Kiousis, S., Wu, X., Losch, M., & Ripley, T. (2004). *The civic bonding of school and family: How KidsVoting students enliven the domestic sphere* (CIRCLE Working Paper 7). Medford, MA: CIRCLE. Retrieved from http://www.civicyouth.org

McNeal, R. B., Jr. (1998). High school extracurricular activities: Closed structures and stratifying patterns of participation. *The Journal of Educational Research, 91(3)*, 183–91.

Meirick, P. C. & Wackman, D. B. (2004) Kids Voting and political knowledge: Narrowing gaps, informing votes. *Social Science Quarterly, 85(5)*, 1161–1177

Nussbaum, M. C., & Sen, A. (Eds.) (1993). *The quality of life*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Oser, F., Althof, W., & Higgins-D'Alessandro, A., (2008) The Just Community approach to moral education: System change or individual change? *Journal of Moral Education, 37(3)*, 395–416.

Phinney, J. (1992). The multigroup ethnic identity measure: A new scale for use with adolescents and young adults from diverse groups. *Journal of Adolescent Research, 7*, 156–176.

Piaget, J. (1932). *The moral judgment of the child*. London: Kegan Paul.

Power, F. C., & Higgins-D'Alessandro, A. (2008). The Just Community approach to moral education and the moral atmosphere of the school. In L. P. Nucci & D. Narvaez (Eds.), *Handbook of moral and character education* (pp. 230–247). New York: Routledge.

Power, F. C., Higgins, A., & Kohlberg, L. (1989). *Lawrence Kohlberg's approach to moral education*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Rawls, J. (1971/2005). *A theory of justice: Revised edition*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Root, S., & Northup, J. (2007). *Project citizen evaluation report*. RMC Research for the Center for Civic Education. Available (from the Center): http://www.civiced.org/pdfs/PC/ProjectCitizen%20FullReport%202007.pdf

Sandel, M. J. (1984). Justice and the Good. In M. Sandel (Ed.), *Liberalism and its critics*. New York: New York University Press.

Schudson. M. (1998). *The good citizen: A history of American civic life*. New York: The Free Press.

Schultz, L. H., Barr, D. J., and Selman, R. L. (2001). The value of a developmental approach to evaluating character development programmes: An outcome study of facing history and ourselves. *Journal of Moral Education, 30(1)*, 3–27.

Sen, A. (1985.) Well-being, agency, and freedom: The Dewey lectures, 1984. *Journal of Philosophy, 82(4)*, 169–221.

Taylor, C. (1984). Hegel: History and politics. In M. Sandel (Ed.), *Liberalism and its critics*. New York: New York University Press.

Vozzola, E., Rosen, J., Higgins-D'Alessandro, A., & Horan, J. (2009). The Scarsdale Alternative School: Perspectives of alumni 5-25 years later on the Just Community experiences. (July 2–5, 2009). Paper presented at the annual conference of the Association for Moral Education, Utrecht, The Netherlands.

Westheimer, J., & Kahne, J. (2004). What kind of citizen? The politics of educating for democracy. *American Educational Research Journal, 41(2)*, 237–269.